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–ARTICLES– 
Caveat Emptor: How the Intersection of Big 
Data and Consumer Genomics 
Exponentially Increases Informational 
Privacy Risks 
Katherine Drabiak, JD† 
Abstract 
Our genomic sequence constitutes the most sensitive and personal of 
information: uniquely identifying us, revealing our propensity to develop 
certain diseases and conditions, and exposing familial connections of close 
genetic relatives. Big Data enables consumer-genomics companies to 
collect, store, and electronically share genomic-sequence data in 
conjunction with numerous pieces of private health and personal 
information. Consumer curation of data currently occurs largely outside 
pertinent federal regulations ordinarily governing the handling of private 
health information, which means consumers may not fully understand the 
implications of the transaction during the process of submitting their 
genomic and health information. This article describes 23andMe’s 
corporate model, including relevant terms contained in its consent and 
privacy policies of which consumers should be aware, and discusses 
practices currently permitted by law that pose significant informational 
risks to individual privacy, including exposing the consumer and his close 
family members to stigma, bias, discrimination, and criminal investigation. 
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I. Introduction 
Our genomic sequence constitutes the most sensitive and personal of 
information. It uniquely identifies us, revealing our propensity for 
developing certain diseases and conditions and exposing familial 
connections to close genetic relatives.1 In the era of Big Data, research using 
genomic information has moved beyond simply utilizing a physical 
biospecimen to including electronically stored genomic-sequence data, 
which permits infinite reproduction and limitless sharing.2 Inexhaustible 
avenues for genomic data-sharing increase the potential for research 
advancements that could potentially uncover markers to identify an 
individual’s risk of contracting a disease, provide new and more effective 
treatment options, and provide targeted information for preventive 
measures.3 Corporations such as 23andMe attempt to merge society’s dual 
 
1. Elizabeth Pike, Securing Sequences: Ensuring Adequate Protections of Genetic 
Samples in the Age of Big Data, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1977, 1980 (2016). 
2. Id. at 1984. 
3. See generally PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, PRIVACY AND 
PROGRESS IN WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCING (2012) [hereinafter Privacy & Progress]. 
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interest in learning more about one’s own genome while capitalizing on the 
attractive utility of a large genomic database for commercial use.4 
As 23andMe revamps its marketing and collection model to respond to 
FDA enforcement of its prior noncompliance,5 consumers may be blinded 
by the technological imperative to know and widely share their genetic 
profile or assuaged by notions of altruism highlighting their contribution to 
important scientific research. Consumers may bypass reading 23andMe’s 
privacy-statement and research-consent policies, or alternatively, they may 
not fully appreciate the implications of the transaction. Under 23andMe’s 
privacy statement and research-consent practices, purchasing the test and 
submitting DNA creates a potentially indelible electronic record of one’s 
genomic sequence in 23andMe’s database, along with a composite mosaic 
of additional health, lifestyle, and consumer-generated personal details.6 
23andMe’s privacy-statement and research-consent practices echo the 
current regulatory standard, which assumes that storing and using de-
identified or aggregate genomic data poses minimal risk to the consumer 
and that the potential for re-identification is unlikely. Legal scholars and 
policymakers have sharply criticized this outmoded view, recognizing the 
high statistical potential of not only unintended disclosures and security 
breaches, but legally permissible uses of the data that pose substantial 
informational risks to consumer privacy.7 Indeed, placing the collection of 
genomic and related health data in the hands of private corporations means 
such transactions occur largely outside the scope of relevant federal 
regulations designed to protect these categories of deeply personal 
information.8 
 
4. Andrew Pollack, 23andMe Will Resume Giving Users Health Data, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/21/business/23andme-will-
resume-giving-users-health-data.html?_r=0. 
5. Letter from Alberto Gutierrez, Director, Office of In vitro Diagnostics and 
Radiological Health, to Ann Wojcicki, CEO, 23andMe, Inc. (Nov. 22, 2013), 
available at 
https://www.fda.gov/iceci/enforcementactions/warningletters/2013/ucm37629
6.htm. 
6. Privacy Highlights, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/about/privacy/ (last 
updated Sept. 29, 2016) [hereinafter Privacy Highlights]. 
7. Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, The New Intrusion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 205, 210-11 
(2012); EXEC. OFFICE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES 8 
(2014) [hereinafter Big Data] (discussing re-identification), at 51 (discussing harms 
including financial loss, intrusion into private life, reputational damage and 
societal harms); Sejin Ahn, Whose Genome is it Anyway? Re-Identification and 
Privacy Protection in Public and Participatory Genomics, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 751, 
766-71 (2015). 
8. Pike, supra note 1, at 2003, 2006-07; Nicholas P. Terry, Big Data Proxies and Health 
Data Exceptionalism, 24 HEALTH MATRIX 66, 69 (2014); Kate Crawford & Jason 
Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward A Framework to Address Predictive 
Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 99 (2014). 
Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017 
Caveat Emptor: How the Intersection of Big Data and Consumer Genomics 
Exponentially Increases Informational Privacy Risks 
146 
The sheer amount of information in genomics databases makes them 
appealing to a number of additional parties, including data brokers, the 
pharmaceutical industry, employers, health insurers, and law 
enforcement.9 Deciding to participate in consumer genomics entails serious 
informational risks in a variety of contexts that could cause the consumer 
or his family members to be subjected to stigma, shame, discrimination, or 
criminal accusations.10 Consumers ought to exercise prudence when 
submitting DNA to consumer genomics companies such as 23andMe and 
enter the transaction with a meaningful understanding of what it means for 
the privacy of their genomic information. 
II. Big Data and Consumer Genomics 
A. The Explosion of Big Data and Health Information 
In the past few years, we have witnessed the explosion of 
interconnected, interactive, and digital data from numerous sources.11 
According to IBM, ninety percent of all the data in the world has been 
generated in the last two years alone and this trend is predicted to 
continue; projections show that the amount of data in the world will double 
every two years.12 The Obama Administration’s Big Data and Privacy 
Working Group stated that the number of sources and the electronic format 
of data collection creates an unprecedented accumulation of data in 
volume, variety, and velocity.13 We currently have numerous points of data 
collection—social media that shows photos of us, our likes, interests, and 
dislikes; commercial databases tracking what we purchase at Target, 
creating a projection of what food we eat and whether we may be 
pregnant; and wearable sensors that monitor whether we are exercising, 
measure our heart rate, and record when we sleep.14 A number of location 
systems reveal where we are at a given moment by accessing GPS chips in 
 
9. See Big Data, supra note 7, at 43 (discussing data brokers), at 40 (discussing 
advertising and marketing), at 32, 40 (discussing law enforcement uses); see 
generally Crawford & Schultz, supra note 8; See generally Ifeoma Ajunwa, Genetic 
Testing Meets Big Data: Tort and Contract Law Issues, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1225 (2014). 
10. Bambauer, supra note 7, at 228-229, 258-261; Big Data, supra note 7, at 49. 
11. Big Data, supra note 7, at 4. 
12. Michael Murphy & John Barton, From A Sea of Data to Actionable Insights: Big 
Data and What It Means for Lawyers, 26 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 8, 15-16 (2014); 
Julie Brill, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address at Carnegie 
Mellon Data Privacy Day, It’s Getting Real: Privacy, Security, and Fairness by 
Design in the Internet of Things (Jan. 28, 2015), available at 
http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/privacy-day/2015/#keynote. 
13. Brill, supra note 12, at 4-5. 
14. Big Data, supra note 7, at 4-5; Murphy & Barton, supra note 12, at 13; Crawford & 
Schultz, supra note 8, at 98. 
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our phones and fitness trackers, tracing cell-tower triangulation of mobile 
devices, mapping use of wireless networks, and tracking any electronic 
payments we make for purchases.15 Termed the “internet of things,” this 
interactive and interconnected web of wearable and portable networked 
devices captures, stores, and transmits data in real time.16 
Increasingly, many of us volunteer to monitor and share private health 
information through fitness trackers and social media or send our DNA to 
consumer-genomics companies to reveal hidden secrets in our DNA. A 
recent study showed that 81.5 percent of consumers would have their 
genome sequenced if they could afford it.17 Our genome uniquely identifies 
us, can reveal a propensity for certain diseases and conditions, and can 
expose deeply personal health information not only about ourselves but 
also our close genetic relatives.18 Legal scholar Nicholas Terry refers to this 
as the “quantified self movement,” a movement in which consumers 
personally collect and curate their own health, wellness, and medically 
inflected data to track progress, learn more about themselves, and make 
assessments about their health.19 
Consumers, however, are not the only eyes viewing this gem of curated 
data; businesses subsequently process, mine, and use the data in predictive 
analytics.20 Ninety percent of connected devices we use collect and 
transmit personal information and seventy percent of these devices 
transmit this information without encryption.21 Big Data’s computational 
and analytic frameworks combine these “large data sets to identify patterns 
to make economic, social, technical, and legal claims.”22 
Population-wide genomic databases capitalize on merging Big Data and 
mining genomic and health information by examining the interaction 
between genes, the environment, and disease.23 Although humans share 
99.9 percent of our DNA sequence in common, scientists believe that the 
remaining genetic variations combined with external factors permits 
researchers to predict individuals’ susceptibility to adverse health 
conditions and development of disease.24 Population-wide genomic 
research examines associations between genetic variants across large 
 
15. Big Data, supra note 7, at 5. 
16. Id. at 2; Murphy & Barton, supra note 12, at 8; Brill, supra note 12. 
17. Ajunwa, supra note 9, at 1232. 
18. Privacy & Progress, supra note 3, at 2; Pike, supra note 1, at 1980. 
19. Terry, supra note 8, at 84. 
20. Id. at 77. 
21. Brill, supra note 12, at 6. 
22. Ajunwa, supra note 9, at 1233. 
23. Pike, supra note 1, at 1981-82. 
24. Id. at 1982. 
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databases containing genomic and associated health data to enhance our 
understanding of common diseases with the goal of improving treatments 
and therapies.25 
B. Technology’s Impact on the Availability and Revocability of Genomic 
Information 
Technology massively shifted the methods of processing, storing, and 
accessing genomic data. One biospecimen of saliva or blood can reveal our 
entire genomic sequence.26 Instead of relying on physically possessing the 
actual biospecimen, processing facilities create an electronic record of the 
genomic sequence and subsequently store it in a cloud, producing a 
permanent record of our private biological profile that can be accessed 
from numerous points and infinitely reproduced.27 Unlike a paper record or 
physical sample that can be expunged, shredded, or destroyed, an 
electronic sequence of genomic data creates an indelible record of our DNA 
that, once shared, may be difficult to contain.28 In some instances, a third 
party may hold and process the data, creating additional access points.29 
Even if the entity collecting the data deletes the primary record from the 
server, additional parties may have already downloaded and shared copies, 
creating a web that is difficult to trace and nearly impossible to fully 
retract.30 Accordingly, many experts consider providing a DNA sample an 
irrevocable decision.31 
Consumer genomics companies like 23andMe capitalize on Big Data’s 
capabilities and the quantified self-movement, collecting genomic 
information, demographic information, health history, and self-reported 
medical information.32 23andMe created a self-collecting and self-reporting 
model for amassing genomic and health information that it subsequently 
processes, analyzes, and sells to interested third parties for a fee.33 As other 
scholars have noted, the value of the data is not limited to serving—or 
 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 1984. 
27. Id.; Jingquan Li, Security Implications of Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing 
Services, 2015 IIEE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BIG DATA COMPUTING SERVICE AND 
APPLICATIONS (2015) 147, at 149-150. 
28. Big Data, supra note 7, at 8-10; Andelka M. Phillips, Genomic Privacy and Direct-
to-Consumer Genetics: Big Consumer Genetic Data- What’s in that Contract? 2015 
IIEE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BIG DATA COMPUTING SERVICE AND APPLICATIONS 
(2015) 60, at 61; Ahn supra note 7, at 768-770. 
29. Big Data, supra note 7, at 32. 
30. Ahn, supra note 7, at 768-770. 
31. Id. 
32. Pollack, supra note 4. 
33. Li, supra note 27, at 149-150; Pike, supra note 1, at 1987. 
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perhaps even intended to serve—the primary purpose for which it was 
collected: to provide information back to the consumer.34 Rather, its value 
resides in the opportunities for numerous secondary uses.35 Indeed, the 
sheer amount of genomic data “invites repurposing at a later stage.”36 
Consumer genomics corporations have not only convinced consumers to 
participate, but “to pay to give their genetic data away” in exchange for the 
informational profile the company offers its consumers.37 
C. Examining 23andMe’s Business Model 
1. 23andMe’s Initial Business Model and FDA Noncompliance 
Among all the consumer genomics companies, 23andMe captured the 
attention of the public, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), the 
media, and defined itself as the reigning consumer genomics corporation.38 
23andMe currently holds the largest database of consumer genomic and 
associated health information, containing over one million consumer 
profiles.39 In 2007, 23andMe began selling to consumers its Personal 
Genome Service (“PGS”), a direct-to-consumer genetic test that offers 
personalized risk assessments for a variety of traits and conditions, 
including predisposition to breast cancer, the risk of developing Alzheimer’s 
disease, ancestry information, and pharmacogenomic profile.40 Chief 
Executive Officer and co-founder Anne Wojcicki stated that she intends to 
revolutionize healthcare by empowering consumers to receive information 
about their genome.41 Wojcicki believes providing consumers such 
 
34. Terry, supra note 8, at 87 
35. Id. 
36. Elizabeth Joh, Policing By the Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 
WASH. L. REV. 36, 54 (2014) (quoting David Lazer and Viktor Mayer-Schonberger). 
37. Pike, supra note 1, at 1987. 
38. This article focuses on 23andMe because it is the largest consumer genomics 
company and has the most dynamic business plan of creating internal drug and 
therapeutics development wing. Anne Wojcicki, One Million Strong: A Note From 
23andMe’s Anne Wojcicki, 23ANDME BLOG (Dec. 11, 2012) [hereinafter One 
Million], https://blog.23andme.com/news/one-million-strong-a-note-from-
23andmes-anne-wojcicki/. 
39. Id. 
40. See 23ANDME, TIME Magazine Names 23andMe’s Personal Genome Service 2008 
Invention of the Year, 23ANDME BLOG (Oct. 30, 2008), 
http://mediacenter.23andme.com/?p=38; see also Erin C., Genetic Test Can 
Reduce Risk from Blood Thinner Warfarin, 23ANDME BLOG (Mar. 16, 2010), 
https://blog.23andme.com/health-traits/study-shows-that-genetic-testing-
reduces-hospitalizations-in-people-taking-the-commonly-used-blood-thinner-
warfarin/. 
41. See Elizabeth Segran, How 23andMe CEO Anne Wojcicki Turned 23andMe Around 
After Falling Out With the FDA, FAST COMPANY (Oct. 21, 2015), 
http://www.fastcompany.com/3052283/most-creative-people/how-ceo-anne-
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information will enable them to take steps to positively impact their health 
and refers to the personal genomics revolution in terms of ownership: “We 
believe you should be able to get your own data and you should be able to 
own your own data.”42 In addition to the goal of consumer empowerment 
through information, 23andMe aims to fundamentally re-envision the 
research process and expedite the timeline to deliver commercial products 
by developing diagnostics and therapeutics internally and working with its 
pharmaceutical, academic, and non-profit research partners using its 
extensive database of consumer genomic and heath information.43 
In recent years, the FDA scrutinized the preliminary question of 
whether 23andMe’s initial PGS test components met threshold regulatory 
compliance requirements to offer the product to the public.44 23andMe’s 
initial PGS consisted of a report of 254 conditions and traits, marketing the 
sale of the PGS as “the first step in prevention” and a method to empower 
consumers to take “steps toward mitigating serious diseases” such as 
diabetes, heart disease, and breast cancer.45 In 2010, several years after it 
began selling PGS, the FDA sent cease-and-desist letters to 23andMe, 
ordering it to discontinue its sales, asserting that PGS was a medical device 
for which 23andMe had not obtained approval to sell.46 During this time, 
23andMe maintained that PGS was an informational product and provided 
a disclaimer on its website that “the information in the personalized health 
report [is] for research, education, and informational use only” and that it 
“did not constitute medical advice.”47 In 2013, the FDA sent a warning letter 
 
wojcicki-turned-23andme-around-after-falling-out-with-the-; see also Wojcicki, 
supra note 38. 
42. Segran, supra note 41; Ariana Eunjung Cha, Anne Wojcicki on 23andMe’s New 
(And Improved?) Personal Genome Service, WASH. POST (Oct. 21, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2015/10/21/anne-
wojcicki-on-23andmes-new-and-improved-personal-genome-service/. 
43. 23andMe Research, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/research/ (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2016). 
44. Jennifer Wagner, The Sky Is Falling for Personal Genomics! Oh, Nevermind. It’s Just 
A Cease and Desist Letter from the FDA to 23andMe, GENOMICS L. REP. (Dec. 3, 
2013), http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2013/12/03/the-sky-is-
falling-for-personal-genomics-oh-nevermind-its-just-a-cease-desist-letter-from-
the-fda-to-23andme/#more-13173. 
45. See John Conley, If 23andMe Falls in the Forest and There’s No One There . . . , 
GENOMICS L. REP. (Dec. 3, 2013), 
http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2013/12/03/if-23andme-falls-
in-the-forest-and-theres-no-one-there/#more-13198. 
46. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(2) (2015) (The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act defines a medical 
device as a device “intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other 
conditions, or in the cure mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease.”); see 
also Wagner, supra note 44. 
47. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(2) (2015); see also Katherine Drabiak-Syed, Baby Gender 
Mentor: Class Action Litigation Calls Attention to a Deficient Federal Regulatory 
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to 23andMe, ordering company to “immediately discontinue marketing” 
PGS to consumers and stating that 23andMe needed to obtain premarket 
review or de novo classification of PGS to sell the test to consumers.48 Based 
on the nature of the product, the FDA enumerated concerns relating to 
23andMe’s failure to demonstrate the test’s analytic validity and clinical 
utility, which exposed consumers to a risk of harm from false positives, false 
negatives, and the potential for consumers to self-manage their treatment 
protocol or abandon physician-recommended therapies based on test 
results.49 
2. 23andMe’s Revived Business Model 
Following regulatory noncompliance related to its sale and marketing 
of the PGS test in 2013, 23andMe transformed its business model.50 It 
began to sell a modified test for consumers to obtain ancestry information 
in the United States and expanded the sale of the original PGS to consumers 
in the United Kingdom and Canada.51 23andMe achieved the goal of 
amassing one of the world’s largest population-wide databases. It 
combined genotypic-phenotypic information from over one million users, 
creating an incredibly attractive prospect for investigators seeking access to 
a large-scale database for research.52 Indeed, in January 2015, 23andMe 
announced a sixty-million-dollar partnership with Genentech to focus on 
Parkinson’s disease.53 This disease focus was personal for Wojcicki—her 
husband at the time, Google co-founder Sergey Brin, found out using 
23andMe’s services that he has a genetic variant that increases his risk of 
developing Parkinson’s disease.54 23andMe also publicized additional 
 
Framework for DTC Genetic Tests, Politicized Statutory Construction, and a Lack of 
Informed Consent, 14 J. MED. & L. 71, 78-82 (2010) (discussing state statutory 
definitions of what constitutes providing medical advice and the practice of 
medicine). 
48. Warning Letter from Alberto Gutierrez, Director, Office of Invitro Diagnostics and 
Radiological Health, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., to Anne Wojcicki, CEO, 23andMe, 
Inc. (Nov. 22, 1013), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/2013/ucm3762
96.htm. 
49. Id. 
50. Pollack, supra note 4. 
51. Katie Collins, 23andMe Approved to Sell Personal Genetics Kits in UK, WIRED UK 
(Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-12/02/23andme-uk-
approval.  
52. Pollack, supra note 4; One Million, supra note 38. 
53. Kevin Davies, Putting the You in Therapeutics, Genome Magazine, GENOME (June 
29, 2015), http://genomemag.com/davies-23andme/#.VqELsPkrI7Y. 
54. Stephanie Lee, Anne Wojcicki’s Quest to Put People in Charge of Their Own Health, 
S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 28, 2015) http://www.sfchronicle.com/news/article/Anne-
Wojcicki-s-quest-to-put-people-in-charge-6108062.php. 
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relationships with other pharmaceutical companies, academic partners, 
and non-profit organizations to utilize the information contained in 
23andMe’s database.55 
In February 2015, 23andMe revived its marketing and sales mission by 
offering a redefined PGS, consisting of a carrier-status report for thirty-six 
autosomal recessive diseases and conditions in addition to ancestry, 
wellness, and trait reports.56 In early 2015, the FDA approved 23andMe’s 
carrier tests and 23andMe currently advertises that it is “the first and only 
genetic service available directly to you that meets FDA standards,” 
distinguishing itself from other consumer-genomics corporations in the 
marketplace.57 23andMe designed the carrier-testing portion of the service 
to provide consumers with information relating to genetic diseases that 
may be relevant when making reproductive decisions.58 A carrier for genetic 
disease is a person who has a genetic variant correlating to the disease or 
condition and has a chance of passing it on to future children, even if that 
person does not manifest the disease.59 If both parents are carriers, there 
is a twenty-five percent chance that their future child will have the 
condition. Parents can consult with a physician and genetic counselor to 
make informed family-planning decisions.60 23andMe’s directional shift to 
introduce carrier testing again resonated on a personal level with Wojcicki, 
arising from her own experiences in the healthcare system and her status 
as a carrier for Bloom syndrome.61 
3. Transforming the Traditional Research Model 
Based on Wojcicki’s extensive media interviews and her personal 
influence in the progression of 23andMe’s services, it appears she sincerely 
believes this business model will both revolutionize healthcare and 
positively impact consumers.62 23andMe’s long-term goal, however, is not 
expanding the traits and conditions that PGS assesses, but instead 
 
55. Davies, supra note 53. 
56. Our Service, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/service/ (last visited Oct. 1, 
2016). 
57. 23andMe Home, 23ANDME (July 8, 2016) https://www.23andme.com/ 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20160708081356/https://www.23andme.com/]. 
58. See Carrier Status Reports, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/service/ (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2016); see also Pollack, supra note 4. 
59. Pollack, supra note 4. 
60. Id. 
61. Lee, supra note 54. 
62. See Research Portal, 23ANDME (July 2, 2016), [hereinafter Archived Research 
Portal] https://www.23andme.com/23andMeResearchPortal/ 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20160702084412/https://www.23andme.com/23
andMeResearchPortal/] (“Core to our mission, is helping people, access, 
understand and benefit from the human genome.”). 
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numerically building its database and selling access to the data, which poses 
additional concerns independent of Wojcicki’s motivations.63 In addition to 
building the genomic database from consumers who purchase PGS, in 2015, 
23andMe created a therapeutics branch to actively recruit new research 
subjects for disease-specific cohorts to investigate illnesses such as 
Parkinson’s disease, lupus, and irritable-bowel syndrome. 64 
This step radically shifted the model for both research and drug 
discovery and delivery. As one article in the San Francisco Chronicle 
characterized it, “23andMe wants to do for health what Google has done 
for search: make massive quantities of information digital, accessible, and 
personal.”65 23andMe transformed this concept of digitalizing and 
compiling genotypic-phenotypic data into a tangible product by creating a 
searchable format for interested investigators to run queries in 23andMe’s 
research portal.66 The research portal is an online searchable 
database of over 650,000 genotyped individuals with more than 225 
[million] phenotypic data points, including demographic, clinical, 
[and] family history information and more. By eliminating the need 
to gather, process, and analyze patient samples, research portal 
empowers scientists to significantly speed the time to discovery and 
publication.67 
Angela Calman-Wonson, 23andMe’s Vice President of Communications 
explained that 
traditional research can take more than a decade and millions of 
dollars to conduct studies with just under a few hundred participants. 
We can undertake real-time research initiatives drawn 
from . . . 23andMe customers who have pro-actively elected to share 
their de-identified genomic information for research and answer 
survey questions. This approach eliminates recruitment times, 
minimizes cost, and reduces the amount of time it takes to conduct 
research.68 
Through this model, 23andMe attracted the attention of a number of 
interested parties—members of the public who seek more information 
 
63. Michael Grothaus, How 23andMe is Monetizing Your DNA, FAST COMPANY (Jan. 5, 
2015), http://www.fastcompany.com/3040356/what-23andme-is-doing-with-all-
that-dna. 
64. See, Research Portal, 23ANDME (Oct. 2, 2016), [herein after Research Portal] 
https://www.23andme.com/23andMeResearchPortal/. 
65. Lee, supra note 54. 
66. Achieved Research Portal, supra note 62. 
67. Id. 
68. Grothaus, supra note 63. 
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about their genomes and believe in 23andMe’s research mission, the 
pharmaceutical industry, and the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”).69 
23andMe’s accelerated research model facilitated highly expedited 
research into Parkinson’s disease by enrolling 3400 Parkinson’s patients, 
identifying two genetic associations for the disease, and publishing findings 
within eighteen months, an attractive beacon for its pharmaceutical 
research partners to follow.70 In the past five years, 23andMe analyzed this 
data to publish thirty-two peer reviewed articles on research conducted 
using the database.71 23andMe also garnered significant financial backing; 
in addition to agreements with Genentech, Pfizer, and private venture 
capitalists, the NIH awarded a $1.4-million grant to assist 23andMe in 
expanding its database.72 
4. Consumer Curation of Genomic and Health Data 
a. Tompkins v. 23andMe’s Holding: Read the Clickwrap 
According to 23andMe, eighty percent of its customers consent to 
additional research, providing their de-identified genomic data and 
answering personal survey questions related to health status, family 
history, and factors potentially impacting disease development.73 Some 
consumers may be motivated by altruistic notions of participating in 
research; as one consumer reasoned, “genetic data is the most personal 
data [he] own[s], but if [his] data can contribute to finding better treatment 
or even a cure, why should [he] think twice about sharing it?”74 
Consumers’ willingness to share such deeply personal information 
raises questions about whether they have a meaningful understanding of 
what the transaction means for the privacy of their genomic data and the 
implications of their participation. Specifically, consumers may be unaware 
of the ramifications of digitalizing genomic data and how digitalizing 
genomic data facilitates its rapid and irrevocable transmission. There are a 
number of terms in 23andMe’s research-consent and privacy-statement 
policies pertaining to privacy and withdrawing from the research portal 
about which consumers may be unaware. 
When a consumer orders a PGS test from 23andMe, the web interface 
presents a box containing links to 23andMe’s Research Consent document 
 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Company Info Fact Sheet, 23ANDME, http://mediacenter.23andme.com/en-
ca/fact-sheet/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2017). 
72. Grothaus, supra note 63. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017 
Caveat Emptor: How the Intersection of Big Data and Consumer Genomics 
Exponentially Increases Informational Privacy Risks 
155 
and Privacy Statement, referred to as a clickwrap.75 To access these 
statements, the consumer must click on the link and read the full policies 
on a separate page.76 Recent jurisprudence in this area affirms that the onus 
is on the consumer to actually click the link, carefully read, and agree to the 
terms when purchasing and using the product.77 In 2014, Tompkins v. 
23andMe addressed whether 23andMe’s customers are bound by the 
product’s terms of service, which include consent and privacy terms, based 
on the clickwrap method of accessing the additional information.78 The 
court in Tompkins held that as long as 23andMe provides actual or 
constructive notice of the site’s terms by providing the consumer a link to 
access, review, and assent to the policies, 23andMe’s method of providing 
consumers notice of terms is sufficient.79 Accordingly, a consumer cannot 
ex post facto void the terms of the commercial sale of service based on his 
failure to read the terms of the agreement.80 
b. A Closer Examination of 23andMe’s Research Consent and Privacy 
Statement 
23andMe’s research-consent terms state that the purpose of the 
research is to make and support meaningful scientific discoveries by 
examining genomic and phenotypic traits associated with the development 
of disease and health conditions.81 23andMe defines “research” as 
“research aimed at publication in peer-reviewed journals and as other 
research funded by the federal government [such as the NIH] or in 
collaboration with other entities including academic institutions and 
pharmaceutical companies.”82 23andMe intends for its research to 
contribute to therapeutics development, support the development of 
diagnostics and drugs to predict and treat illness, and commercialize its 
 
75. Phillips, supra note 28, at 61; Tompkins v. 23andMe, 2014 WL 2903752 (N.D. Cal. 
2014). 
76. Still Have Questions About Research?, 23ANDME, 
https://www.23andme.com/research/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2017). 
77. Tompkins, 2014 WL 2903752, at *6 (Stating that “the [terms of service (“TOS”)] 
resemble clickwrap agreements, where an offeree receives an opportunity to 
review terms and conditions and must affirmatively indicate assent . . . The fact 
that the TOS were hyperlinked and not presented on the same screen does not 
mean customers lacked adequate notice.”); Id. at *9 (Concluding that “the Court 
decides that the named Plaintiffs accepted the TOS when they created accounts 
or registered their DNA kits.”). 
78. Id. at *6. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at *8-9. 
81. Privacy Highlights, supra note 6, at § 4(b). 
82. Id. 
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knowledge to improve healthcare.83 23andMe suggests that participants 
benefit from consenting to research in that it allows them the opportunity 
to contribute to science by providing their genetic information to support 
research into the causes of illness, develop new drugs and treatments, and 
predict a person’s risk of disease.84 
23andMe uses consumer data for a number of different purposes. 
23andMe discloses that it will share genetic and personal data within the 
company, that it de-identifies the data, and that the investigator studying 
the data does not have access to the consumer’s name or contact 
information.85 23andMe’s current policies delineate that it may use 
consumers’ information for scientific-research purposes, either conducted 
within 23andMe or through a research partner, if the consumer consents 
to such research.86 23andMe’s research portal consists of genomic data and 
self-disclosed information from surveys such as family history, current 
health status, personal traits, age, racial origin, sexual orientation, and 
ethnicity.87 23andMe may share aggregate de-identified data with external 
researchers and other agencies as required by law, but the research-
consent terms state that the data are summarized across enough customers 
to minimize the chance that a consumer’s personal information will be 
exposed.88 Thus, even if investigators are using de-identified data, the 
aggregate information contains individual genomic sequences combined 
with multiple pieces of highly personal and potentially identifying 
information. 
Both 23andMe’s research-consent terms and privacy statement 
disclose the risks of participation in research and describe potential privacy 
risks.89 23andMe’s privacy statement and research consent describe the 
physical, technical, and administrative measures it institutes to protect 
consumer information. It also outlines the methods it uses to minimize the 
 
83. Id. 23andMe has published 32 peer reviewed studies in the past five years and 
obtained a patent related to its research on Parkinson’s disease. See Company Info 
Fact Sheet, supra note 73 (discussing peer reviewed research); see also Anne W., 
Announcing 23andMe’s First Patent, 23ANDME (May 28, 2012), 
https://blog.23andme.com/news/announcements/announcing-23andmes-first-
patent/; Bob Grant, Gene Patent Stirs Controversy, SCIENTIST (June 4, 2012), 
http://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/32143/title/Gene-
Patent-Stirs-Controversy/ (discussing criticism relating to seeking profit over 
democratizing innovations in genomics). 
84. Research Consent, 23ANDME, [hereinafter Research Consent] 
https://www.23andme.com/about/consent/. 
85. Id. at 4. 
86. Id. at 6. 
87. Id. at 3; Privacy Highlights, supra note 6. 
88. Research Consent, supra note 84. 
89. Id.; Privacy Highlights, supra note 6. 
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possibility of an unintended breach, such as de-identifying the data, and to 
enhance consumer confidence, such as obtaining a Certificate of 
Confidentiality from the NIH.90 23andMe’s research-consent terms indicate 
to consumers that “genetic data, survey responses, and/or personally 
identifying information may be stolen in the event of a security 
breach . . . they may be made public or released to insurance companies, 
which could have a negative impact on your ability to obtain insurance 
coverage.”91 The research-consent terms also state that there is a risk that 
a third party could compare partial genetic data with published research 
results and identify individual consumers, though it describes this endeavor 
as “extremely difficult” but “possible.”92 23andMe’s privacy statement 
explains how it contracts with third-party service providers to process and 
analyze saliva samples. Despite the measures intended to protect 
informational security, 23andMe disclaims that it “cannot guarantee 
confidentiality and security of this information due to inherent risks 
associated with storing and transmitting data electronically.”93 As an 
anticipatory shield against backlash litigation related to this term, 23andMe 
also includes a clause that disclaims any liability for unintended or negative 
consequences arising from purchasing the product.94 
Even if a consumer declines to allow 23andMe to use his genomic and 
personal information for research use, 23andMe’s privacy statement still 
allows the company to use the individual’s information for other purposes, 
including any purpose 23andMe believes is permissible under current laws 
and regulations and use for targeted marketing and advertising.95 
23andMe’s Privacy Statement describes in detail the types of information 
that it collects, such as tracking, collecting, and storing consumer web 
behavior. 23andMe uses cookies, web beacons, and device identifiers that 
record the consumer’s internet-protocol address, clickstream data, and 
geographic location.96 23andMe also encourages consumers to share and 
disclose their purchase or participation in research through social media by 
offering a Facebook like or share button and a button that connects to 
LinkedIn.97 If consumers use a third-party site like Facebook or LinkedIn, 
 
90. Privacy Highlights, supra note 6, at § 6(c) (discussing security measures); Research 
Consent, supra note 84, at 4 (discussing how 23andMe aims to minimize the 
potential for a privacy breach). 
91. Research Consent, supra note 84, at 5. 
92. Id. 
93. Privacy Highlights, supra note 6, at § 4(d). 
94. Id. at 5(c) (“23andMe will have no responsibility or liability for any consequences 
that may result because you have released or shared information with others.”). 
95. Id. at § 4. 
96. Id. at § 3(c). 
97. Id. at § 3(a)(v). 
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23andMe may collect additional personal consumer information available 
through their social-media accounts, including their profile picture, 
network, gender, username, age range, and list of friends.98 
According to the privacy statement, 23andMe may internally use and 
share with third parties consumer information without the consumer’s 
consent if the information has been “anonymized or aggregated so [the 
consumer] cannot be reasonably identified as an individual.”99 23andMe’s 
Privacy Statement promises that it will not “sell, lease, or rent your 
individual level information” without explicit consent.100 However, this 
distinction must be read in conjunction with the rest of the terms contained 
in the privacy statement. Specifically, the privacy statement contains a 
clause that reserves 23andMe’s unilateral right to change the terms of its 
privacy statement at any time by providing email notification to 
consumers.101 Thus, according to the terms outlined in the current privacy 
statement, 23andMe may properly change its current policy at a later date 
and elect to share or sell existing complete consumer profiles with every 
fully identifying detail. 
Both the research consent document and privacy statement contain 
provisions to address situations in which a consumer wishes to remove his 
information from the research portal. If a consumer wishes to withdraw 
from research, the consumer must notify 23andMe’s customer-care 
team.102 Thirty days after receiving the request, 23andMe will discontinue 
future use of the consumer’s genomic and self-reported data.103 
Withdrawing from research, however, has no impact on research in 
progress, research that has already been conducted or published using that 
consumer’s information, or research conducted by an associated research 
entity if the consumer’s genomic and self-reported information has already 
been shared with that entity.104 Accordingly, withdrawing from research 
still permits ongoing research use of the consumer’s information within 
23andMe and by external entities and only prevents the initiation of new, 
discrete research projects using that consumer’s information. 
Furthermore, withdrawing from research does not remove one’s 
genomic and self-reported information from 23andMe’s database.105 
 
98. Id. at § 3(a)(viii). 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at § 6(g). 
102. Research Consent, supra note 84, at 6. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. (Stating “choosing not to give consent or withdrawing from 23andMe Research 
will not affect access to your Genetic Information,” meaning that the 23andMe 
retains the consumer’s information in its electronic database even if it no longer 
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Unless a consumer specifically contacts 23andMe’s customer care and 
requests that 23andMe close his account, the consumer’s information 
remains in 23andMe’s database, even if it is no longer used in new, discrete 
research projects conducted by 23andMe or its research partners.106 Even 
if a consumer requests that 23andMe completely close the account, 
23andMe states that it or a third party contracted to perform sequencing 
may retain consumer genomic information, including backup copies as 
required by law or pursuant to 23andMe’s data-protection policies.107 
23andMe also retains consumer registration information for accounting, 
audit, and compliance purposes.108 Thus, even if a consumer attempts to 
close her account, 23andMe reserves the right to retain an indelible record 
of her full genomic sequence, highly personal self-reported information, 
and fact of participation. 
c. Integrating Tompkins with 23andMe’s Policies 
In summary, 23andMe explicitly discloses that it collects and stores 
massive amounts of information, creating an alarmingly complete 
consumer profile for each consumer, including his genomic sequence, 
name, self-disclosed family history, health conditions, race, ethnicity, sexual 
orientation, age, social networks, place of employment, as well as a record 
of every website that he clicks on, photos, and real-time tracking of his 
geographic location. 
The detailed provisions set forth in 23andMe’s research-consent terms 
and privacy statement that favor collecting, retaining, and sharing 
consumer information reiterate the gravity of the holding in Tompkins for 
enforcing online terms of service.109 If a consumer does not follow the 
prompts in 23andMe’s clickwrap to read the research consent and privacy 
statement or reads them and fails to understand the permanent nature of 
the transaction, then he may face a number of unanticipated outcomes. He 
cannot discontinue external entities’ use of his genomic and self-reported 
information, even if he discovers these entities are conducting research to 
which he is opposed, such as cloning or creating chimeras. The consumer 
likely has little or no remedy available to remove his information from 
23andMe’s database and fully erase his participation. This poses 
informational risks stemming from 23andMe’s continued retention of the 
consumer’s genomic and consumer information. If 23andMe shares the 
data after modifying the terms of the privacy policy or if the information is 
disclosed by breach, the consumer may face increased risk of informational 
 
uses it for active research); see also Privacy Highlights, supra note 6, at 6(d) 
(describing account closure). 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Privacy Highlights, supra note 6, at § 5(d). 
109. Tompkins, 2014 WL 2903752, at *5-7, 9. 
Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017 
Caveat Emptor: How the Intersection of Big Data and Consumer Genomics 
Exponentially Increases Informational Privacy Risks 
160 
harms. Furthermore, if 23andMe or a third party uses this information for 
targeted marketing that results in personal embarrassment, loss of 
employment, or denial of insurance coverage, 23andMe’s policies 
specifically bar any legal recourse against 23andMe for harm arising from 
these disclosures.110 
III. Regulations Governing Consumer Genomics 
A. Outside the Regulatory Framework 
The massive paradigm shift from collecting genomic and health 
information in the healthcare setting to the commercial arena means the 
transaction of collection, use, and distribution may occur outside the scope 
of regulatory structures designed to protect health data privacy and to 
ensure that companies have consumers’ informed consent when they 
provide DNA.111 Regulatory protections are contingent upon whether the 
law defines the party who collects and initially holds the data as a covered 
entity.112 Under the Department of Health and Human Services’ (“HHS”) 
regulation for the Protection of Human Subjects—also called the Common 
Rule—and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(“HIPAA”), covered entities are subject to specific requirements pertaining 
to consent for research and procedures for maintaining health information 
privacy.113 However, HIPAA does not include commercial entities such as 
consumer-genomics companies in its definition of covered entity, so 
consumer-genomics companies are not required to adhere to HIPAA’s 
standards for security and privacy.114 Thus, HIPAA does not apply to 
curation of consumers’ health data or provide any protections related to 
privacy, security, or minimizing access. Similarly, the regulations set forth in 
the Common Rule do not govern a commercial entity’s practices unless it 
conducts research that is supported by a federal department or agency.115 
Currently, even if a commercial entity receives federal funding for its 
research using collected consumer DNA and health information, the entity 
may assert that the Common Rule does not apply. Under the current 
version of the Common Rule, the Office of Human Research Protections 
(“OHRP”) clarified that it 
 
110. See Privacy Highlights, supra note 6, at § 6(g) (discussing 23andMe’s ability to 
change terms of the Privacy Policy); Id. at § 5(c) (discounting any liability of 
adverse outcomes: “23andMe will have no responsibility or liability for any 
consequences that may result because you have released or shared personal 
information with others.”). 
111. See Terry, supra note 8, at 69; Pike, supra note 1, at 1996-97, 2001, 2003. 
112. See Pike, supra note 1, at 2003. 
113. See Terry, supra note 8, at 68-69; see also Pike, supra note 1, at 2002-04. 
114. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2013); Terry, supra note 8, at 69-71, 84. 
115. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2013). 
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does not consider research involving only coded private information 
or specimens to involve human subjects as defined under 45 CFR 
46.102(f) if the following conditions are both met: 
(1) the private information or specimens were not collected 
specifically for the currently proposed research project through and 
interaction or intervention with living individuals; and 
(2) the investigator(s) cannot readily ascertain the identity of the 
individual(s) to whom the coded private information or specimens 
pertain.116 
Accordingly, even if 23andMe were defined as a covered entity under 
the Common Rule based on its receipt of federal funds from the NIH, it 
could assert that the consumers who contribute DNA and private health 
information for research are not considered human subjects because 
23andMe de-identifies consumers’ information prior to placing it into the 
research portal. Aligned with this interpretation of the Common Rule, 
23andMe currently maintains that its data-mining analysis “does not 
constitute research on human subjects.”117 This stance is significant 
because it means that 23andMe believes that the consent it obtains to 
retain, use, and share consumer data from the sale of PGS is not necessary 
to comply with current regulations; rather, they believe that obtaining 
consent is a commercial transactional courtesy. 
To compare, investigators who conduct research using human subjects 
are required, pursuant to the Common Rule, to obtain informed consent 
from subjects and take affirmative steps to relay the risks and benefits of 
participation in a manner that subjects can comprehend and evaluate.118 In 
addition to the regulatory requirements set forth in the Common Rule, 
investigators at a covered entity are bound by ethical principles governing 
human-subject research set forth by the National Commission for the 
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research in its 
Belmont Report.119 These ethical principles—respect for persons, 
beneficence, and informed consent—convey the spirit of the Common Rule 
as a mechanism for protecting research subjects from undue risk of harm 
and ensuring that subjects adequately comprehend the risks and benefits 
associated with participation during the informed-consent process.120 This 
 
116. Guidance on Research Involving Coded Private Information or Specimens, OFF. 
HUMAN RES. PROTS., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/cdebiol.html (last updated March 21, 2016). 
117. Grothaus, supra note 63. 
118. 45 C.F.R. 46.116 (2013). 
119. See Belmont Report, OFF. HUMAN RES. PROTS., U.S. DEP.’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. (Apr. 
18, 1979), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/belmont.html. 
120. Id. 
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dialogue between researcher and participant intended as a means to 
convey risks and benefits shifts dramatically when the consent process 
occurs online via consumer interaction with a website clickwrap interface 
rather than with a physical point-of-contact person from the research team. 
For both consumers who purchase PGS, as well as consumers who elect to 
participate in 23andMe’s research protocols, the web-based interface 
presents an entangled, complex package including consumer service, 
medical information, and research components.121 Legal scholar Andelka 
Phillips argues that this transaction more accurately represents assent than 
actual informed consent, because the consumer agrees to 23andMe’s 
terms in order to purchase PGS without understanding the provisions set 
forth in the informed-consent terms and privacy statement.122 
B. Commercial-Law Standards and the Federal Trade Commission 
Even if 23andMe asserts that it is not bound by the current version of 
the Common Rule, its practices are subject to commercial-law standards. 
However, commercial law presumes that consumers act with autonomy 
and free will when sharing and curating their genomic and personal health 
data.123 Categorizing this transaction as governed by commercial law 
sharply limits the legal and ethical requirements normally imposed on an 
entity collecting, using, and sharing genomic and health data, as compared 
to collection and use occurring pursuant to the Common Rule. 
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) disseminates policy initiatives, 
provides consumer education tools, and issues enforcement actions as a 
means of protecting consumer privacy and preserving consumer control 
over the collection and use of consumers’ personal data.124 In a 2015 speech 
on the topic of data privacy, FTC Commissioner Julie Brill recognized the 
impact of the internet of things to create user-generated health data and 
the challenges of protecting consumers’ personal information against 
unwanted disclosures.125 At this juncture, however, privacy-law protections 
for personal information and consumer data are contingent upon a number 
of factors, such as the type of information collected, the classification of the 
collecting entity, and the purpose of collection and subsequent use.126 
In 2015, President Obama released the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights 
Act (“CPBRA”), intended as a measure to provide consumers with greater 
 
121. See Phillips, supra note 28, at 62. 
122. See id. 
123. See Terry, supra note 8, at 84; see also Phillips, supra note 28, at 61. 
124. See generally Protecting Consumer Privacy, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/protecting-consumer-
privacy (last visited Apr. 1, 2017). 
125. See Brill, supra note 12, at 1-2. 
126. See Lisa J. Sotto & Aaron P. Simpson, United States, in DATA PROTECTION & PRIVACY 
2014, at 191-93 (Rosemary Jay et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2014). 
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transparency, control, and security in their personal information in 
commercial transactions.127 Despite legislative intent to increase 
commercial transparency and consumer control,128 the proposed CPBRA 
would not force any meaningful changes to 23andMe’s practices. First, 
CPBRA, if enacted, would only apply to “personal data,” which includes 
any data that are under the control of a covered entity, not otherwise 
generally available to the public through lawful means, and are 
linked, or as a practical matter linkable by the covered entity, to a 
specific individual, or linked to a device that is associated with or 
routinely used by the an individual,129 
but the definition as currently drafted specifically excludes de-identified 
data. Thus, if 23andMe continues to de-identify data prior to pooling the 
genotypic and phenotypic information into its research portal, the CPBRA 
would not apply if Congress passes the bill as it is written. 
C. Anticipated Changes to Common Rule 
Whether federal regulatory requirements apply to 23andMe is 
particularly murky, based on scholarly disagreements over the 
interpretation of current federal regulatory standards relating to 
biospecimen research, as well as impending changes to existing regulatory 
requirements.130 
Recently, OHRP published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking expressing 
its intent to revise relevant portions of the Common Rule, specifically 
pertaining to the collection of human biospecimens intended for 
biobanking.131 The proposed rule contained a number of notable changes 
from the previous version as it relates to the collection of biospecimens.132 
 
127. Administration Discussion Draft: Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2015, 
DEMOCRATIC MEDIA, [hereinafter Admin. Discussion Draft] 
https://www.democraticmedia.org/sites/default/files/field/public/2015/draft_c
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Analysis of the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & 
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privacy-bill-of-rights-act/. 
128. See Admin. Discussion Draft, supra note 127, at § 101(a)-102(a). 
129. Id. at § 4 (a)1. 
130. See id. 
131. See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 80 Fed. Reg. 53933, 
53933, 53936-37 (Sept. 8, 2015). 
132. See Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Research Protections for 
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First, if an entity receives federal funding for any of its research activities, 
the proposed rule would apply to all research activities that the entity 
conducts independent of funding.133 The proposed rule would streamline 
the consent process and permit written blanket consent for future use of 
biospecimens and associated private health information.134 OHRP also 
intends to promote research transparency by requiring the collecting entity 
to disclose specific risks, including informational risks related to the privacy 
and security of the biospecimen and related private health information.135 
This provision represents a partial victory for privacy advocates, as 
numerous scholars have noted that the risks associated with participating 
in biospecimen research are not physical but informational risks such as 
stigma, embarrassment, and discrimination.136 These informational risks 
crucial information required for subjects to appropriately assess the risks of 
participating versus the benefits during their informed consent process.137 
The proposed rule also departs from the current regulations, requiring 
research entities that use prospectively collected biospecimens to obtain 
blanket consent from subjects even if the entity strips identifiers from the 
biospecimen, though it clarifies that this policy would not retroactively 
apply to existing collections.138 
D. Applying Anticipated Changes to 23andMe 
OHRP’s proposed rulemaking would potentially impact consumer 
genomics’ corporate-consent policies pertaining to all data collection if the 
corporation receives federal funding for any of its research projects. 
According to 23andMe, its research is “aimed at peer-reviewed journals and 
other research funded by the federal government.”139 Thus, if 23andMe 
receives federal funding for any of its research, the consent process for all 
prospective collection would have to comply with OHRP’s future rule. If 
OHRP adopts this provision, compliance would include disclosing 
informational risks and drafting a policy designed to ensure that consumers 
adequately comprehend and assess the risks and benefits of permitting 
 
modified March 21, 2016); HHS Proposes Major Overhaul of the Common Rule, 
ROPES & GRAY (Sept. 8, 2015), 
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133. Regulatory Changes in ANPRM, supra note 132. 
134. See Human Subjects Research Protections, supra note 132, at 44514, 44519. 
135. Id. at 44513-14. 
136. See generally Ahn, supra note 7, at 756; Ajunwa, supra note 9, at 1228, 1249; 
Bambauer, supra note 7, at 217. 
137. See Human Subjects Research Protections, supra note 132, at 44519; see generally 
Ahn, supra note 7, at 778; Ajunwa, supra note 9, at 1256. 
138. See Human Subjects Research Protections, supra note 132, at 44519. 
139. Privacy Highlights, supra note 6, at § 4(b). 
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23andMe and subsequent entities to use their DNA and private health 
information. However, any changes to the Common Rule’s requirements for 
informed consent would not impact 23andMe’s existing database of one 
million sequenced genomes and associated consumer-generated health 
information.140 
Significantly, OHRP’s proposed rule also recognizes that advances in 
technology rapidly shift the assessment of what data is identifiable and 
what data is de-identified, conceding that “much of what is currently 
considered de-identified data is also potentially identifiable data” and that 
it is possible to extract DNA from a biospecimen itself and potentially 
link it to otherwise available data to identify individuals. 
Consequently, we are considering categorizing all research involving 
the primary collection of biospecimens as well as storage and 
secondary analysis of existing biospecimens as research involving 
identifiable information.141 
Although numerous legal scholars have promoted this viewpoint,142 it is 
uncertain at this juncture whether OHRP will redefine the applicability of 
the coverage based on identifiability.143 
If OHRP integrates these changes into the Common Rule, then 
23andMe’s current research-consent document and consent process would 
not comply with the Common Rule’s new strictures. 23andMe would need 
to obtain consent for research use of genomic and self-reported 
information collected in the future, independent of whether it de-identifies 
the information, if 23andMe continues to receive federal funding from the 
NIH. 23andMe would also need to modify terms describing risk to indicate 
a higher likelihood of re-identification and the occurrence of other 
informational risks associated with the use of genomic and self-reported 
information. Perhaps most importantly, 23andMe would need to address 
the consent process. The proposed rule would require 23andMe to change 
its consent process; its current process, though compliant with Tompkins 
and perhaps with the Common Rule’s current strictures, fails to meet the 
 
140. See Human Subjects Research Protections, supra note 132, at 44519. 
141. Id. at 45424-25. 
142  See Katherine Drabiak-Syed, Legal Regulation of Banking Newborn Blood Spots for 
Research: How Bearder and Beleno Resolved the Question of Consent, 11 HOUS. J. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 41-44 (2011) (arguing even anonymization is insufficient 
because DNA is the ultimate identifier); Pike, supra note 1, at 2017; Ahn, supra 
note 7, at 766-68. 
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de-identified biological specimens used in biobanking research does not 
constitute human subjects research.  
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high standards required to obtain actual affirmative informed consent.144 
To compare, the Personal Genome Project at Harvard Medical School 
pioneered a novel informed-consent document and process, describing 
risks and benefits with hypotheticals and testing participant 
comprehension.145 The Personal Genome Project’s transparency is a model 
for best practices, under which a participant makes an informed decision 
based on an adequate understanding of the benefits and risks, not an 
indelible decision that causes the consumer regret and unanticipated 
informational risks.146 Most importantly, the consumer should understand 
that being fully informed of benefits and risks does not prevent other 
parties from accessing or using the genomic and personal information in a 
manner that is detrimental to the consumer.147 
IV. Connecting Database Information Back to the Consumer 
A. De-identification and Re-identification 
The current regulatory structure abides by the fiction that de-identified 
data cannot practicably be re-linked or cause harm to individuals because 
de-identification makes finding the source of the data more difficult.148 To 
de-identify data, a collecting entity commits to stripping identifying details 
from the data or to encrypting the data and promising not to re-identify 
it.149 Increasingly, privacy advocates and even the Obama Administration’s 
Big Data and Privacy Working Group recognized that de-identification as a 
means of protecting individual privacy “is, at best, a limited proposition” for 
 
144. See Phillips, supra note 28, at 61 (arguing consumers likely do not read the 
clickwraps); id. at 62 (stating the consumer must “consent” to a consumer service, 
obtaining sensitive medical information, and to participate in a research protocol 
simultaneously, which is both confusing and the process of assent does not meet 
the requirement for informed consent); see also Josef Mejido, Personalized 
Genomics: A Need for a Fiduciary Duty Remains, 37 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 
281, 304-305 (2011) (arguing that holders of genetic information and the 
contributor of that information should be categorized as a fiduciary relationship). 
145. But see Consent Form, HARV. PERSONAL GENOME PROJECT 4, https://my.pgp-
hms.org/static/PGP_Consent_2014-02-18_online.pdf (last modified Feb. 18, 
2014). 
146. See id. at 6 (describing, in detail, information risks to the participant, including 
how disclosure of data could impact employment, insurance, financial well-being, 
and social interactions, notably providing hypothetical scenarios to enhance 
participant’s actual comprehension of the concept of informational risks); id. at 
13 (employing a comprehension test following the consent process to check for 
participant understanding of research benefits and risks). 
147. Mejido, supra note 144, at 299. 
148. See Pike, supra note 1, at 1996. 
149. See Big Data, supra note 7, at 8. 
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several reasons.150 Perhaps most importantly, because DNA is the ultimate 
identifier, it cannot be truly de-identified.151 Combining a unique genomic 
sequence with numerous pieces of demographic and medically inflected 
data makes re-identification of sensitive health data easier.152 Furthermore, 
there is a delicate trade-off between protecting privacy and retaining the 
associated information that makes the data useful; protecting privacy by 
stripping away too much associated information decreases the data’s 
scientific and research value.153 Finally, rapidly evolving technology 
produces effective techniques designed to re-identify data, but forecasting 
de-identification measures designed to protect data privacy are difficult to 
devise.154 
Even if a consumer-genomics company de-identifies the consumer’s 
profile, there are a number of other avenues for collecting data and piecing 
together a composite prediction of the consumer’s address, socioeconomic 
background, and, ultimately, full identity.155 Numerous studies have 
demonstrated that it is possible to re-identify data that has been de-
identified according to current regulatory standards set forth in HIPAA, 
using information such as birth year and state of residency or through 
information publicly available through the Internet.156 Our connectivity and 
burgeoning use of social media and even seemingly trivial public postings 
also exponentially increases the amount of public information tied to our 
identity. Researchers are discovering that even data that appears 
anonymous, such as Netflix reviews, contain unique attributes and clues 
that assist in re-identifying an individual.157 As legal scholar and bioethicist 
Amy McGuire summarized, “to have the illusion you can fully protect 
privacy or make data anonymous is no longer a sustainable position.”158 
B. Predictive Analytics Paint a Data Mosaic 
Big Data’s ability to collect, organize, process, and analyze each piece 
of data in concert creates a mosaic of details, painting an image of a 
 
150. See id. at 8. 
151. See Pike, supra note 1, at 1996. 
152. See id. 
153. See Big Data, supra note 7, at 8; Pike, supra note 1, at 1996. 
154. See Big Data, supra note 7, at 8. 
155. See Brill, supra note 12, at 2, 7-8; see, e.g., Crawford & Schultz, supra note 8, at 
94-95, 101. 
156. See Pike, supra note 1, at 1996; Ahn, supra note 7, at 767-768; see also Gina 
Kolata, Web Hunt for DNA Sequences Leaves Privacy Compromised, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/18/health/search-of-dna-
sequences-reveals-full-identities.html?_r=0. 
157. Murphy & Barton, supra note 12, at 13. 
158. Pike, supra note 1, at 1996. 
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person’s identity. Consumers leave behind data exhaust—pieces of 
information showing what they look at online, their location, what 
purchases they make, and photos of them on social media.159 The devices 
consumers use log and track their activity, showing purchase of the DNA 
test, revealing where they are geographically located, and reporting these 
details back to 23andMe, in addition to tracking any self-disclosure of 
additional information through social media.160 Many people’s photos—
including many of mine—are publicly available online, whether through 
Google image search or via social media. As several commentators on Big 
Data have noted, the public uses Facebook as a means to give away our 
privacy and seclusion through updating our statuses, joining groups, and 
liking various causes.161 
Professors Kate Crawford and Jason Schultz describe the process of 
predictive modeling to create a data mosaic based on available information, 
concluding that “not only can massive amounts of online behavior be 
collected and assessed to compute the probabilities of an individual’s 
particular demographic characteristics, but that predictive analysis can also 
become a form of [personally identifiable information] as well.”162 Each 
piece of data, interpreted together, produces a compilation of deeply 
revealing personal information and inferences about our identities, even if 
the database de-identifies the genomic information.163 
Computational modeling utilizes predictive mathematical algorithms to 
produce a composition of highly personal details.164 Data are compiled into 
an informational mosaic that infers details relating to a person’s identity. 
However, the resulting conclusions, by their very nature, are statistical 
models independent of the prediction’s accuracy and may simply be 
incorrect.165 Professors Crawford and Schultz describe one example of how 
Target used predictive modeling based on its customers’ purchases to 
predict which ones were pregnant.166 Target disclosed this information to 
marketers, who sent out presumptuous marketing materials congratulating 
them before the women themselves had announced their private news.167 
When it comes to applying predictive models and identifying disclosures of 
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private or potentially stigmatizing conditions and diseases, the risk for harm 
to the subject to whom the data pertains rises exponentially. 
V. Informational Risks Arising from Participation in Consumer 
Genomics 
A. Raising Concerns about Privacy 
In 2013, science writer and New York University journalism professor 
Charles Seife flagged privacy concerns in an article he wrote for Scientific 
American.168 Seife extended the comparison of 23andMe’s searchable 
database as the Google of health research to posit that if Google tracks, 
monitors, and sells user data contrary to its privacy policies or changes its 
privacy policies if they do not suit its purpose, 23andMe might act in concert 
or utilize its right to change privacy policies to sell identifiable consumer 
information, too.169 Although 23andMe reassures consumers that it does 
not provide individual-level identifiable genomic information without 
obtaining consent, Seife warned such promises should be utterly 
unconvincing to consumers given Google’s history of selling consumer 
information.170 
Google Ventures’ managing partner Bill Maris’ recent statements to the 
public lend support to Seife’s words of caution.171 In October 2015, Maris 
spoke at a Wall Street Journal technology conference, dismissing consumer 
privacy concerns relating to their genomic information.172 Maris asked 
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171. See Eric Newcomer, “Your Genome Isn’t Really Secret,” Says Google Ventures’s Bill 
Maris, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 20, 2015), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-20/-your-genome-isn-t-
really-secret-says-google-ventures-s-bill-maris (explaining how Bill Maris, Google 
Ventures managing partner and an investor in 23andMe, is interested in building 
genomic databases to slow aging, reverse disease, and extend life. Maris also 
helped form the company Calico, another company that uses data obtained from 
consumer genomics companies for its scientific research). 
172. See id. 
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“What are you worried about? Your genome isn’t really secret.”173 His 
dismissive attitude toward the privacy of genomic information and risks 
associated with its disclosure and widespread use could potentially impact 
consumer-genomics companies’ corporate policies in the future. Maris has 
a hand in both 23andMe and Ancestry, the most sizable consumer genomics 
databases in the United States.174 Maris’ Google Ventures provides financial 
support to 23andMe, and Maris co-founded Calico, a company that focuses 
on age-related diseases and recently signed an agreement to use Ancestry’s 
database.175 
As Seife described, 23andMe’s business model “is a one-way portal into 
a world where corporations have access to the innermost contents of your 
cells and where insurers and pharmaceutical firms and marketers might 
know more about your body than you know yourself.”176 Seife’s chilling 
words may not be far-fetched based on Google’s history and Maris’ 
statements when read in conjunction with the terms of 23andMe’s privacy 
statement.177 
B. Defining Privacy and Disclosures 
The Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, an 
advisory committee created during President Obama’s administration, 
defines privacy as a concept that “includes confidentiality, secrecy, 
anonymity, data protection, data security, fair information practices, 
decisional autonomy, and freedom from unwanted intrusion.”178 The 
Obama Administration’s Big Data and Privacy Working Group 
acknowledged the impact of Big Data on the privacy of sensitive 
information, maintaining that corporate policies should aim to protect 
personal privacy, ensure fairness, and prevent discrimination.179 For 
genomic and highly personal health data that can be re-identified or 
predictively traced back to an individual, privacy serves as a mechanism for 
preventing shame, embarrassment, bias, or discrimination arising from 
unwanted disclosure of that information.180 
Disclosure may occur through legally permissible means according to 
the terms set forth in corporate privacy statements, as discussed in Section 
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II. In addition to permitted disclosures, data breaches may also compromise 
consumer privacy. As legal scholar Nicholas Terry points out, technology 
fundamentally shifts the amount and accessibility of information available 
to interested parties, transforming previously held silos of information in 
varied formats held by discrete entities into a centrally located database in 
an easily reproducible form.181This change attracts increased utilization of 
the information contained in centralized databases such as 23andMe’s 
research portal, both by permitted entities and unauthorized parties.182 
Electronic storage, access, and sharing increases the potential for 
unintended disclosures or informational breach, ranging from unintentional 
mix-ups—such as when 23andMe sent PGS results to the incorrect 
customers—to hackers attempting to capitalize on the data’s value.183 
C. Entities Interested in Accessing the Consumer Genomics Database 
Genotypic and phenotypic information is not only a gold mine for 
health research, but also holds immense value for data brokers, marketing 
and advertising corporations, pharmaceutical companies, employers, 
insurers, and law enforcement.184 Although a majority of individuals are 
willing to volunteer their genomic and highly personal health data, a recent 
study showed that ninety-one percent of people are concerned about the 
privacy of their information.185 In this study, individuals cited concerns that 
despite trusting the researchers using the data, their information might end 
up in the wrong hands and be used against them.186 Consumer enthusiasm 
for readily volunteering genomic and highly private information in the 
consumer genomics arena while expressing privacy concerns appears to be 
a paradox; I posit that it is likely that individuals are unaware of the range 
of subsequent uses for their genomic and personal information.187 
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Analytics firms, data brokers, and similar entities might use the 
genomic and personal information for predictive modeling and draw 
various inferences about whether and how to market a product, decide 
suitability for employment, deny insurance coverage to an individual or 
group, or target suspects in a criminal investigation.188 Such predictive 
inferences presume numerous details about individuals, such as their 
behavior, characteristics, and attributes such as race, ethnicity, sexual 
orientation, health and disease status. Each of these inferences may be 
incorrect, but other entities may still base their decisions upon them in ways 
that could adversely affect the consumer.189 Even if the entity correctly 
matches the genomic and health information to the individual, the use of 
genomic information in a vacuum results in inaccurate reductionism, fails 
to account for our limited understanding of the genome and its complex 
impact on health, and ignores the limitations of statistical models as a 
means of forecasting health outcomes.190 Finally, and perhaps most 
problematically, entities may use this information against consumer 
interests in a number of areas that are currently permitted by law.191 
1. Data Brokers and Marketing 
Data brokers are corporations that offer to businesses and government 
agencies services such as marketing products, verifying an individual’s 
identity, or providing reports intended for insurance, employment, 
healthcare, and credit entities.192 Data brokers collect data across multiple 
sources—clickstream data, social media, and network interactions—and 
combine it with publicly available information, then aggregate each piece 
of information and analyze the data into a profile.193 According to the Big 
Data and Privacy Working Group, these profiles may contain thousands of 
pieces of data that the data broker inputs into an algorithm to produce a 
predictive composite to aid the purchasing entity in making business 
decisions.194 The purchasing entity then makes numerous decisions based 
on this predictive information, resulting in data determinism—assessments 
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of risk or suitability based on a statistical model—independent of its actual 
accuracy.195 
It is foreseeable that the information contained in consumer-genomics 
databases such as 23andMe’s would be attractive to data brokers; they 
could include these additional pieces of information and sell the analyzed 
data to interested parties.196 As noted in Section III, if a consumer provides 
his genomic information and discloses sensitive personal and health 
information, consumer curation may occur outside the scope of federal 
regulations designed to maintain the privacy of such information. Further, 
although 23andMe’s current privacy statement currently promises not to 
sell individually identifiable data, it explicitly retains the right to unilaterally 
change its privacy statement at any time and elect to sell the data to data 
brokers.197 Data brokers could, in turn, legally sell highly sensitive pieces of 
information about consumers, such as mental health status, history of 
addiction, genetic risk of developing Parkinson’s disease, and sexual 
orientation, that could be used for targeted marketing and by employers 
and insurance companies.198 
2. Pharmaceutical Corporations 
Pharmaceutical companies currently spend astronomical sums on 
marketing prescription drugs, including a combined $4.5 billion on direct-
to-consumer (“DTC”) advertising in 2014.199 Statistics also demonstrate that 
advertisements markedly impact consumer behavior and physician 
prescribing.200 A recent study showed that after seeing a DTC 
advertisement, one-third of patients mentioned a drug advertised by name, 
one-fifth requested that drug, and physicians prescribed the requested 
drug about forty percent of the time when it was specifically mentioned by 
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the patient.201 Pharmaceutical companies could tailor their advertisements 
to target market groups or individuals based on the data broker’s predictive 
modeling. They could target advertisements for chemopreventive drugs to 
consumers with a projected risk of cancer, selective serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors to consumers with presumed mental illness, and antiretroviral 
advertisements to consumers with HIV. Receiving such advertisements in 
one’s place of business or home could cause shame, embarrassment, and 
stigma to the individual and harm both personal and professional 
relationships.202 Although some legal scholars have argued for extending 
the tort framework for invasion of privacy to the nonconsensual disclosure 
of genetic information, such precedent is not currently well established.203 
Additionally, proving causation and damages as a result of the disclosure 
would likely be difficult, and as a result, individuals harmed by the outcome 
of this advertising would have little legal recourse to address these 
injuries.204 
3. Discrimination in Employment and Insurance 
The information contained in consumer-genomic databases would also 
appeal to both employers and insurers. Employers seek to hire healthy 
workers over employees who may become ill or unable to perform their 
duties, because “unhealthy employees pose huge costs to employers in the 
form of above-average absenteeism, decreased productivity, overtime 
payments to hire workers to cover absent employees’ shifts, higher job 
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turnover, administrative costs inherent in hiring, recruiting, and training 
replacements, and higher workers’ compensation insurance premiums.”205 
Employers and insurers can utilize statistical modeling or individually 
linked data to predict which individuals will be healthy and subsequently 
make numerous decisions related to hiring, firing, and promoting in the 
employment context or coverage eligibility in the insurance context based 
on that information. Creating analytical models to predict what categories 
of people or specific individuals are healthy could become part of an entity’s 
standardized assessment criteria used as a means to avoid other categories 
of bias in the decision-making process.206 These standardized assessments 
would provide the appearance of objectivity based on projected health and 
capability outcomes. However, researchers Solon Barocas and Andrew 
Selbst warn that conscious or subconscious assumptions may enter the 
process of formulating algorithms and predictive models, allowing data 
mining and predictive modeling to perpetuate bias under the guise of 
mathematical neutrality.207 Barocas and Selbst further posit that data 
mining could provide a cover for intentional discrimination, reproduce 
residual institutionalized discrimination, and create a barrier to 
adjudicating civil rights violations.208 
In 2008, Congress passed the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination 
Act (“GINA”), designed to provide federal protection from discrimination 
based on genetic information in employment and insurance contexts.209 
Currently, GINA contains several notable shortcomings relating to both 
statutory coverage and the ability to use it as a mechanism for addressing 
and remedying genetic discrimination.210 Importantly, GINA defines genetic 
information as information about an individual’s genetic test, the genetic 
tests of family members, and “the manifestation of a disease or disorder in 
family members of such individual.”211 Thus, genetic information excludes 
an individual’s current physical or mental condition, as opposed to genetic-
 
205. See Ajunwa, supra note 9, at 1240 n. 83 (quoting Lauren Perdue). 
206. Bambauer, supra note 7, at 272 (discussing how “employers, like all humans, are 
susceptible to biases or unexamined assumptions.”). 
207. Solon Barocas & Andrew Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671, 
677 (2016). 
208. Id. at 675. 
209. See What is genetic discrimination?, U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED. (Apr. 11, 2017), 
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/testing/discrimination; Genetic Discrimination, 
NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., available at http://www.gnome.gov/10002077. 
210. See Ajunwa, supra note 9, at 1239, 1252 (discussing definitions and coverage 
related to GINA); Privacy & Progress, supra note 3, at 27, 44 (discussing how only 
a few cases have tested using GINA as a vehicle to prevent and remedy genetic 
discrimination). 
211. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 
881, at § 101(d)(6)(A)(iii). 
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variant status or presumptions about genetic-variant status, nor would it 
include statistical modeling that predicts risk or propensity for developing a 
disease, as indicated in data-broker models.212 In addition to the narrow 
scope of the definition of genetic discrimination, recent cases brought 
under GINA demonstrate the high bar for plaintiffs to establish a 
defendant’s intent to discriminate.213 
Similarly, insurers could seek to avoid offering coverage or inflate 
premiums for particular insurance categories to prohibitive levels, either 
generally based on this modeling or based on individually identifiable 
information for select categories of insurance coverage. With respect to 
insurance contexts, GINA does not apply to disability, life, or long-term-care 
insurance.214 Accordingly, disability, life, and long-term-care insurance 
companies may legally acquire and use predictive modeling—as well as 
individually identifiable genetic and health information—from consumer-
genomics companies to make coverage and premium decisions.215 
4. Police Power and Law Enforcement 
In addition to these risks, using genomic databases for law-
enforcement purposes is no longer a theoretical possibility; it has already 
occurred.216 Law-enforcement utilization of these databases will 
foreseeably expand to enhance research related to medical and behavioral 
genetics associated with crime prevention.217 The Big Data and Privacy 
Working Group has discussed the importance of using predictive analytics 
for determining criminal propensity and crime prevention, and the 
Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues has addressed 
circumstances under which it is permissible to use genetic data for law-
 
212. Ahn, supra note 7, at 776-778 (discussing a case where the definition of “genetic 
information” is contested and plaintiffs’ showing of termination for physical and 
mental disabilities did not constitute genetic discrimination.). 
213. See Ajunwa, supra note 9, at 1252 (discussing limitations during adjudication of 
GINA claims where plaintiffs must show discriminatory intent, not merely 
disparate impact to succeed on their claims.). 
214. See What is genetic discrimination?, supra note 208. 
215. See id.; see also Ahn, supra note 7, at 776-778. 
216. See Jim Mustian, New Orleans Filmmaker Cleared in Cold Case Murder: False 
Positive Highlights Limitations of Familial DNA Searching, NEW ORLEANS NEWS 
ADVOC. (Mar. 12, 2015), 
http://www.theneworleansadvocate.com/news/11707192-123/new-orleans-
filmmaker-cleared-in; Justin Poulsen, Your Family’s DNA Could Turn You into a 
Suspect, WIRED (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/10/familial-dna-
evidence-turns-innocent-people-into-crime-suspects/; Claire Maldarelli, 
23andMe Discloses Police Requests for Customers’ DNA, POPULAR SCI. (Nov. 22, 
2015), http://www.popsci.com/23andme-publishes-transparency-repoty-that-
reveals-authority-dna-requests (stating that 23andMe received five requests for 
consumer DNA from law enforcement and 23andMe claimed to deny access). 
217. See Poulsen, supra note 216. 
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enforcement purposes without consent.218 It is highly probable that 
consumer genomics databases could be a massive resource for medical and 
behavioral genetics research examining the genetic and biological basis of 
crime; this database would provide an alternate route for accessing a large 
data pool for states that otherwise prohibit such studies using DNA 
collected from arrestees and criminals.219 
a. Big Data as a Resource for Targeted Policing 
The Big Data and Privacy Working Group asserted that Big Data should 
be used to serve the public good and that data obtained by the government 
should be made available, discoverable, and usable.220 Such uses include 
developing statistical models to analyze the propensity for criminal 
behavior, predict future crimes, create profiles of criminal suspects, and 
increase targeted patrols in crime hot spots.221 Integrating these goals with 
the availability of consumer-genomics databases creates numerous 
possibilities for use in law enforcement. The Presidential Commission for 
the Study of Bioethical Issues (“Commission”) stated that only using 
identifiable genomic information requires obtaining the individual’s 
consent. By distinguishing that consent is contingent upon identifiability, 
the Commission’s position permits using the aggregated, de-identified 
genomic information in consumer databases, independent of whether the 
consumer consented to additional research use.222 Furthermore, as 
discussed in Section II, consumer-genomics companies may change their 
privacy policies at any time, potentially allowing them to provide 
identifiable information for research use or to law-enforcement 
agencies.223 
Notably, the Big Data and Privacy Working Group cited the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Smith v. Maryland, which held that an individual has no 
 
218. Big Data, supra note 7, at 31 (discussing predictive analytics to assess propensity 
to crime); id. at 11 (discussing using data for the public good broadly); see also 
Privacy & Progress, supra note 3, at 6 (distinguishing only identifiable genomic 
data requires the subjects consent to use); id. at 6 (discussing using genetic data 
for law enforcement purposes with consent). 
219. See Sarah Berson, Debating DNA Collection, 264 NAT’L INST. OF JUST. J. 9, 11 (2009) 
(noting some statutes prevent using criminal DNA databases for research into 
predicting or identifying medical or genetic disorders; and accessing and using the 
information contained in consumer genomics databases would provide a means 
to conduct such research). 
220. Big Data, supra note 7, at 11. 
221. Id. at 29-30. 
222. Id. at 45. 
223. But, if OHRP enacts the proposed changes in the Common Rule requiring consent 
for research use even of de-identified data, then 23andMe would need to modify 
its Consent document and policy as well as face limitations regarding unilateral 
modification of its Privacy policy. 
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reasonable expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily provides to 
a third party.224 This decision has tremendous implications for federal 
agencies’ use of the information contained in consumer-genomic 
databases, because Smith’s holding quashes Constitutional privacy claims 
about government intrusion when accessing and using genomic and health 
information.225 The Supreme Court’s decision in Maryland v. King further 
extends the permissible use of DNA.226 In King, the Court described DNA-
typing as a “brief” and “minimal” intrusion to individual privacy, effectively 
categorizing DNA collection as ordinary law enforcement.227 The 
government has an interest “in knowing whom they are dealing with” when 
investigating both specific crimes and general patterns of crime, which 
includes not only criminal history, but also publicly available records, 
records of violence or mental disorders, and employment status, family ties, 
and character.228 The Supreme Court’s opinion in King “opened the door for 
a broad police power historically unprecedented in our constitutional 
jurisprudence.”229 
b. Using Consumer Genomics for Medical and Behavioral Genetics 
Evolving criminal jurisprudence reflects a pattern of minimizing 
potential privacy concerns while awarding greater discretion to those in 
possession of the genomic databases to define permissible uses of the data. 
This allocation of power increases the probability that the information 
contained in the consumer-genomics databases will be used for broad 
police-power functions and for research on medical and behavioral genetics 
that would form the basis of subsequent interventions on marginalized 
populations. Historically, federal agencies, such as the National Institute of 
Justice (“NIJ”) and the National Institute of Mental Health (“NIMH”), have 
sponsored numerous programs designed to investigate the biological basis 
of criminal behavior and to create preventive measures.230 The NIJ’s goal is 
“to strengthen science that advances justice;” to achieve this goal, it funds 
research examining biological factors relating to propensity for aggression, 
 
224. Big Data, supra note 7, at 32-33. 
225. See generally Erin Murphy, License, Registration, Cheek Swab: DNA Testing and 
the Divided Court, 127 HARV. L. REV. 161, 163-66 (2013). 
226. Id. at 168. 
227. Murphy, supra note 225, at 174-75 (discussing DNA typing as “brief” and 
“minimal” intrusion); id. at 177 (discussing how DNA collection now constitutes 
ordinary law enforcement). 
228. Id. at 179. 
229. Id. at 178. 
230. See generally Marvin Wolfgang et al., Criminal Violence: Biological Correlates and 
Determinants, NAT’L INST. OF JUST. (1981), 
https://www.njrs.gov/pdffiles/Digitization/82358NCJRS.pdf. 
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violence, and crime.231 The NIJ provides funding to research that includes 
studies examining associations between epilepsy, substance abuse, ADHD, 
and serotonin levels and aggressive behavior and crime rates.232 Such 
research is highly stigmatizing and often grossly and inaccurately 
summarized by media through reductionist terms, such as announcements 
of a violence gene found in certain population groups.233 Scientists criticize 
these proclamations as largely unreliable predictive determinants of 
behavior and acts of crime and as inaccurate proxies for predicting 
outcomes, because social, economic, and environmental factors both 
mediate gene expression and influence behavior.234 The NIJ sponsors 
numerous laudable preventive measures and uses DNA databases to clear 
innocent subjects and appropriately direct law-enforcement resources, but 
the potential to expand use of existing genomics database for research on 
medical and behavioral genetics poses highly troubling implications.235 
These categories of research threaten to shame and stigmatize 
vulnerable population groups, such as those suffering from neurological 
disorders, mental illness, and addiction, as well as target and marginalize 
sweeping categories of racial and ethnic minorities. Federal agency leaders 
historically not only proffered scientific proposals of race as a predictor of 
 
231. Id. at v.; see also Berson, supra note 219. 
232. See Kevin Beaver, The Intersection of Genes, the Environment, and Crime and 
Delinquency: A Longitudinal Study of Offending (2006) (PhD dissertation, Univ. of 
Cincinnati), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/231609.pdf 
(A 430 page dissertation funded by an NIJ grant and published through a link 
available on the NIJ website that provides a comprehensive analysis of the 
correlations between dopamine function, serotonin function, and MAOA variant 
status on levels of aggression, delinquency, substance abuse, arrest, and 
commission of crimes); See also Wolfgang et al., supra note 230 (providing an 
overview of historical research funded by NIJ). 
233. See Melissa Hogenboom, Two Genes Linked with Violent Crime, BBC NEWS (Oct. 28, 
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-29760212 (describing 
research published in Molecular Psychiatry that stated 5-10% of all violent crime 
in Finland could be attributed to individuals with the MAOA gene variant; 
Hogenboom’s subtitles for the article include “Warrior Gene” and “Crime Gene,” 
describing the link between MAOA variations and aggressive behavior, which 
inaccurately summarizes the content of her article, as well as the science behind 
it). 
234. Id. (Including a quote from Jan Schnupp from the University of Oxford at the close 
of the article, who criticized the work, stating: “to call these alleles ‘genes for 
violence’ would therefore be a massive exaggeration. In combination with many 
other factors these genes may make it a little harder for you to control your violent 
urges, but they emphatically do not predetermine you for a life of crime.”). 
235. See Berson, supra note 219 (discussing clearing innocent suspects and redirecting 
law enforcement); see also James Nolette, Using Research to Move Policing 
Forward, 276 NAT’L INST. OF JUST. J. 46, 47 (2015) (discussing using statistical models 
for allocating police resources); Joh, supra note 36, at 42-48 (discussing generally 
the utility of predictive policing). 
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potential violence and criminal activity, but listed examining race as a 
research priority to understand whether “males and black persons have a 
higher potential for violence” in recent decades.236 In the early 1990s, then-
Director of the NIMH Frederick Goodwin promoted a highly controversial 
program called the Violence Initiative, which was designed to study inner-
city children who he alleged had “biochemical and genetic defects [that] 
will make them prone to violence later in life.”237 During public speeches 
attempting to garner support for this research initiative, he compared the 
inner city to a devolving jungle and inner-city youth to rhesus monkeys, 
arguing that these adolescent male monkeys live in gangs and “only want 
to kill each other, have sex, and reproduce.”238 Goodwin’s plan included 
alarmingly early intervention; his intent was to start by monitoring four-
month-old infants for potential violence and providing pharmaceutical 
treatments to correct such “biochemical derangements.”239 As psychiatrists 
Peter Breggin and Ginger Ross Breggin noted at the time, such research 
could result in phony scientific evidence to support police-power use of 
biomedical intervention in allegedly high-risk populations, both furthering 
racial bias and threatening civil liberties.240 
Combined with the statistical modeling of Big Data, this so-called 
research in the field of medical and behavioral genetics can be integrated 
into a framework for compiling a composite profile for preventive policing 
techniques that zeroes in on allegedly risky population groups or used to re-
identify and monitor risky individuals in the database. This system would 
appear neutral on its face, as it is based on scientific studies and 
computational analytics, but as Crawford and Schultz exposed, schematics 
to monitor, flag, and predict future crime are far from perfect and produce 
false alarms.241 In one example, Crawford and Schultz described how a 
computational program to predict and prevent crime and terrorism led the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and National Security 
Administration to erroneously zero in on and flag peaceful Catholic nuns 
and a respectable political candidate as suspected terrorists, demonstrating 
 
236. Peter Breggin & Ginger Ross Breggin, A Biomedical Programme for Urban Violence 
Control in the US: The Dangers of Psychiatric Social Control, 11 CHANGES: AN INT’L J. 
OF PSYCHOL. & PSYCHOTHERAPY 59, 60 (1993) (quoting the National Academy of 
Sciences “Research Priorities” and “Key Questions” from the early 1900s 
coinciding with Frederick Goodwin’s push to adopt the Violence Initiative). 
237. Id. 
238. Id.; see also Boyce Rensberger, Science and Sensitivity, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 1992), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1992/03/01/science-and-
sensitivity/285e7541-3b66-48c4-9cc9-55fb37d013f9/. 
239. See Breggin & Breggin, supra note 236, at 62 (discussing monitoring infants); id. at 
60 (discussing pharmaceutical industry partnership to “correct” “biochemical 
derangements.”). 
240. Id. at 65. 
241. Crawford & Schultz, supra note 8, at 104. 
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the limitations of relying on allegedly accurate algorithms in the context of 
predictive policing. 
c. Accessing Consumer Genomics Databases to Aid in Active Criminal 
Investigations 
Law-enforcement agencies have already demonstrated interest in 
using consumer-genomics databases as part of their active criminal-
investigation process.242 In March 2015, the New Orleans Advocate 
published a story describing how the Idaho Falls Police Department gained 
access to Ancestry’s consumer genomics database in an effort to solve a 
cold-case murder from the mid-1990s.243 Police used a DNA sample from 
the crime scene and performed familial matching, trying to find potential 
suspects by examining the DNA’s Y chromosome using Ancestry’s 
database.244 Investigators found a partial match between the DNA from the 
crime scene and Michael Usry Sr., who contributed a biological sample to 
Sorensen Molecular Genealogy Foundation, which was subsequently 
acquired by Ancestry, years prior through a genealogy project sponsored by 
his church.245 Police began investigating Usry’s relatives, and through 
publicly available information including Facebook photos and posts, found 
Michael Usry Jr., a filmmaker living in New Orleans.246 Usry Jr. appeared to 
fit the murderer’s profile—he had social ties to the geographic area, was 
present in the area during the time of the crime, and in his career path as a 
horror filmmaker, he reveled in depicting gruesome and grisly murders.247 
Using this information, police traveled to New Orleans and located Usry Jr. 
for interrogation.248 Police provided this evidence to a judge, successfully 
obtained a warrant that ordered Usry Jr. to produce a DNA sample for 
comparison, and questioned his involvement in the 1996 Idaho case.249 
  
Police eventually cleared Usry Jr. because his DNA did not match the 
DNA found at the scene of the crime.250 Though Usry Jr. suffered no harm 
 
242. Mustian, supra note 216; Poulsen, supra note 216. 
243. Mustian, supra note 216. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. 
247. Id. 
248. Id. 
249. Id. 
250. Id.; see Andrew Pollack, DNA Evidence Can Be Fabricated, Scientists Show, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 17, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/18/science/18/dna.html?_r=0 (This is 
particularly important in conjunction with considering that DNA evidence at a 
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because the police subsequently cleared his name, it is unlikely that Usry 
Sr. would have contemplated that participating in consumer genomics to 
trace his genealogy in a church-sponsored project would cause his son 
anxiety, embarrassment, and shame for being accused of a violent crime he 
did not commit. Consumers need to consider not only the ramifications of 
participation on their own lives—including law-enforcement use of their 
DNA—but also the impact on their current and future genetically related 
family members. 
As law professor Erin Murphy commented, 
I think what we are looking at is a series of totally reasonable steps 
by law enforcement. But it has this really Orwellian state feeling to it, 
and it is a huge indictment of private genetic testing companies and 
the degree to which people seamlessly share that information 
online.251 
In late 2015, 23andMe published a transparency report disclosing that it 
had received four requests for consumer DNA from state law enforcement 
and the FBI.252 23andMe claimed that it had denied all requests and did not 
share consumer DNA for those requests.253 However, it is reasonable to 
believe that law enforcement will again seek access to the millions of DNA 
samples held in consumer genomics databases as a means to solve crimes 
and identify suspects.254 
VI. Conclusion 
Technology substantially improves society’s ability to collect, store, and 
use genomic and private health information, enabling consumer-genomics 
companies like 23andMe to electronically hold a complete consumer profile 
of its customers, including their genomic sequence, name, self-disclosed 
family history, health status, health conditions, race, ethnicity, sexual 
orientation, age, social networks, place of employment, a record of every 
website they click on, photos, and their current geographic location. 
Consumer curation of deeply personal information currently occurs largely 
outside the scope of the federal regulations ordinarily governing these 
practices. 23andMe’s electronic clickwrap process for obtaining consent to 
 
crime scene can be constructed and planted as a means to falsely implicate a 
suspect.). 
251. Mustian, supra note 216. 
252. Id. 
253. Id. 
254. 23andMe currently has one million DNA sequences stored, and Ancestry.com also 
has one million sequences stored. See Wajcicki, supra note 36; Anna Swayne, 
AncestryDNA Celebrates One Million People Tested, ANCESTRY BLOGS (July 16, 2015), 
http://blogs.ancestry.com/ancestrydna-celebrates-one-million-people-tested/. 
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use consumer genomic and health information in the commercial 
transaction challenges the traditional consent process for participating in 
research. This structural challenge poses questions about whether the 
consumer accesses and understands the privacy implications of 23andMe’s 
privacy statement and research-consent form pertaining to the 
informational privacy risk they accept and the irrevocability of their decision 
to participate. Consumer genomics databases are a tremendous resource 
for advancing scientific and medical research. However, this gold mine of 
information also appeals to data brokers, targeted marketers, employers, 
insurers, and law-enforcement agencies, whose use of the data poses 
myriad informational risks, including subjecting the consumer to shame, 
stigma, discrimination, or criminal accusation. It is imperative that 
consumers understand the implications of their purchase and carefully 
weigh the benefits of purchasing the test and supporting 23andMe’s 
research mission against the substantial risks to their genomic privacy. 
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Controlling Excessive Off-Label Medicare 
Drug Costs Through the False Claims Act 
David Kwok† 
Abstract 
High prescription drug prices are driving ever-increasing United States 
healthcare costs, and the federal government is following this alarming 
trend with ninety-five billion dollars in expenditures for prescription drugs 
under Medicare Part D. Even accepting arguments that high drug prices 
are necessary to encourage the development of safe and effective drugs, 
Medicare Part D is flawed in that it will pay top dollar for ineffective drugs. 
Because Part D lacks adequate oversight for off-label drug usage, 
pharmaceutical companies obtain windfall profits for drugs that have not 
been proven effective for off-label conditions. Permitting companies to 
reap such profits without incurring the costs of demonstrating efficacy 
creates a distorted marketplace that leads to excessive Medicare drug 
expenditures. In addition to the financial burden to taxpayers and the risks 
to Medicare patients’ health, the flaws in Medicare Part D also increase 
the risk that non-Medicare patients will be prescribed ineffective and 
expensive drugs. This article proposes a theoretical reimbursement 
scheme that encourages fairness and restrains excessive off-label drug 
reimbursement by tying reimbursement rates to competitive products. 
Fully correcting this systemic problem will require substantial statutory, 
regulatory, and institutional reforms that are not immediately likely. In the 
interim, courts and regulators should embrace the civil False Claims Act to 
begin to correct the incentive problems created under the present off-
label reimbursement structure, thereby immediately curbing excessive 
Medicare spending on prescription drugs. 
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I. Introduction 
High prescription-drug prices have been generating alarm in the 
media and in Congress,1 and the federal government is no stranger to 
prescription-drug purchases. Medicare spending on outpatient 
prescription drugs through Medicare Part D was ninety-five billion dollars 
in 2016, amounting to thirteen percent of overall Medicare benefit 
payments.2 The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) have 
acknowledged that total Part D costs per capita have been rising at a 
troubling eleven-percent rate.3 Pharmaceutical companies 
(“manufacturers”) typically justify high drug prices by citing the costs of 
research and development.4 The high prices offset the substantial costs 
incurred in conducting scientific studies to demonstrate that drugs are 
safe and effective in treating particular conditions.5 High expenditures on 
drugs are arguably good for society and not excessive if patients are 
obtaining sufficient benefit from those drugs. 
 
1. See, e.g., Improving Access To Affordable Prescription Drugs Act, H.R. 1776, 
115th Cong. (2017); John Russell, How 2015 Became the Year of Prescription 
Drug Price Outrage, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 24, 2015), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-drug-prices-1229-biz-20151224-
story.html; Margot Sanger-Katz, Prescription Drug Costs Are Rising as a 
Campaign Issue, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/22/upshot/prescription-drug-costs-are-
rising-as-a-campaign-issue.html; Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes From $13.50 a 
Tablet to $750, Overnight, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/a-huge-overnight-increase-in-a-
drugs-price-raises-protests.html; Andrew Pollack, Drug Prices Soar, Prompting 
Calls for Justification, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 23, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/business/drug-companies-pushed-from-
far-and-wide-to-explain-high-prices.html. 
2. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, JANUARY 2017 MEDICARE BASELINE, 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/recurringdata/51302-2017-01-
medicare.pdf; See also KAISER FAMILY FOUND., The Facts on Medicare Spending and 
Financing, http://kff.org/medicare/fact-sheet/medicare-spending-and-financing-
fact-sheet/ (last updated Jul. 24, 2015); see also Charles Ornstein, New Hepatitis 
C Drugs are Costing Medicare Billions, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/medicare-spent-45-
billion-on-new-hepatitis-c-drugs-last-year-data-shows/2015/03/29/66952dde-
d32a-11e4-a62f-ee745911a4ff_story.html. 
3. Press Release, Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services, Medicare 
Prescription Drug Premiums Projected to Remain Stable (July 29, 2015), available 
at https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Press-
releases/2015-Press-releases-items/2015-07-29.html. 
4. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Rockoff, How Pfizer Set the Cost of Its New Drug at $9,850 
a Month, WALL ST. J. (Dec 9, 2015 http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-art-of-
setting-a-drug-price-1449628081. 
5. See, e.g., Seth D. Knocke, Incentivizing Innovation: Pharmaceutical Pricing in the 
United States and the United Kingdom, 20 ANNALS HEALTH L. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 177, 
178 (2011). 
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The problem, however, is that Medicare Part D can pay manufacturers 
these high drug prices without a full demonstration that the drugs are 
effective. By law, Medicare reimbursements are limited to drugs 
prescribed for medically accepted indications—conditions for which there 
is scientific evidence that a drug will be safe and effective.6 In practice, 
however, there is no systemic mechanism to ensure that drugs are 
actually prescribed for such an indication.7 Drug prescriptions are not 
required to include the indication for which the drugs are prescribed 
under Part D.8 Furthermore, a physician may legally prescribe a drug for 
various “off-label” indications—conditions not formally approved by the 
Food & Drug Administration (“FDA”).9 
This system is unfair, and it creates perverse incentives for 
manufacturers. A manufacturer who has not incurred the costs of 
completing scientific studies demonstrating its drug’s effectiveness can 
earn greater revenue than a competing manufacturer who has completed 
such studies for its alternative drug. This distorted system drives excessive 
Part D spending, because the government pays more for the unproven 
drug in comparison to the fully tested drug.10 In a rational system, the 
government would not pay higher prices for a drug with less evidence to 
indicate that it is safe and effective. These high prices are likely to drive 
aggressive manufacturer’s marketing efforts to physicians, and patients 
may be exposed to higher probabilities of expensive and unproven off-
label drug usage. 
This article proposes a theoretical reimbursement framework that 
eliminates this distortion and unfairness by capping off-label 
reimbursements at a competitive level. A drug that is prescribed for its on-
label, FDA-approved condition will continue to receive existing full 
reimbursement. If a drug is prescribed for an off-label condition, however, 
its reimbursement level will be tied to the competitive market for the off-
label condition. A manufacturer that has not completed scientific studies 
regarding off-label drug usage will not receive a higher reimbursement 
than a competing manufacturer that has completed those studies. This 
 
6. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ENSURING THAT 
MEDICARE PART D REIMBURSEMENT IS LIMITED TO DRUGS PROVIDED FOR MEDICALLY ACCEPTED 
INDICATIONS (2011), http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-07-08-00152.pdf 
[hereinafter OIG PART D REIMBURSEMENT REPORT]. 
7. See id.; See also Tracy Weber, Charles Ornstein & Jennifer LaFleur, Medicare 
Drug Program Fails to Monitor Prescribers, Putting Seniors and Disabled at Risk, 
PROPUBLICA (May 11, 2013), http://www.propublica.org/article/part-d-prescriber-
checkup-mainbar. 
8. See OIG PART D REIMBURSEMENT REPORT, supra note 6. 
9. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 349-51 (2001). 
10. Jon Elswick, Boosting Medicare Part D Rebates May Help Consumers, but Hurt 
Pharma, STAT NEWS (May 11, 2016), 
https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/05/11/medicare-drug-pricing-
obama/. 
Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017 
Controlling Excessive Off-Label Medicare Drug Costs Through the False Claims Act 
189 
framework is superior to existing proposals in that it allows room for the 
development of optimal levels of off-label drug usage. Medicare 
beneficiaries will still have access to drugs for off-label purposes and 
manufacturers will have the proper incentives for research. 
While attractive in theory, fully implementing this theoretical 
reimbursement framework is challenging in the short term. Like other 
proposals, it requires the integration of prescription and diagnosis 
information. There are difficult structural and statutory barriers to such 
integration; state law generally governs prescription information11 and the 
federal government has been hesitant to interfere.12 Additionally, the 
present standard for tracking patient diagnoses does not correspond with 
Part D reimbursement rules.13 
In the interim, this article proposes civil False Claims Act (“FCA”) 
liability as a claw-back mechanism to control Part D expenditures by 
limiting the present system’s distortions and inequity. While 
manufacturers may temporarily enjoy excessive profits through ever-
growing levels of off-label drug reimbursement, civil liability under the FCA 
will allow the government to reclaim, or “claw back,” those unfair profits 
and help fund the need for better links between diagnosis and 
prescription. Unlike other forms of immediately available civil litigation, 
such as tort liability, the FCA incorporates a whistleblower cause of 
action.14 Whistleblowers are critical in supplying the core missing 
information linking prescriptions to diagnoses. Without such 
whistleblowers, litigation lacks the funding and support to compile the 
missing information. 
FCA liability has already been applied to subset of off-label 
reimbursement scenarios: off-label promotion cases against 
manufacturers.15 Under the existing theory, manufacturers are liable for 
excessive Medicare expenditures because their promotional efforts induce 
physicians to prescribe off-label drugs that result in improper Medicare 
reimbursement.16 This article’s proposed FCA solution expands on this 
theory by including any manufacturer behavior that is a cause-in-fact of 
excessive Medicare expenditures. Furthermore, FCA liability should be 
 
11. See OIG PART D REIMBURSEMENT REPORT, supra note 6. 
12. See James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, And Informed 
Consent: Debunking Myths And Misconceptions, 53 FOOD DRUG LAW J. 71, 76 
(stating that the FDCA was “not intended as a medical practices act and [did] not 
interfere with the practice of the healing art.”); See also Weber et al., supra note 
7 (quoting Jonathan Blum, director of Medicare, that agency philosophy “really 
has been to defer to physicians.”). 
13. See OIG PART D REIMBURSEMENT REPORT, supra note 6 
14. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012). 
15. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 50-53 
(D. Mass. 2001). 
16. Id. 
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calibrated to the competitive market for the patient’s diagnosis; 
manufacturers should be liable for any windfall profits that result when 
their off-label reimbursement exceeds the competitive market rate for 
drugs with scientifically proven efficacy. 
The FCA can be a surprisingly effective claw-back mechanism as a 
short-term solution. Applying a claw-back mechanism to all manufacturers 
who benefit from off-label reimbursements would provide properly 
aligned incentives and eliminate inequity from the present system. 
Part II describes the regulatory environment and structure that leads 
Medicare Part D to be susceptible to excessive drug costs through off-label 
drug reimbursement. Part III highlights that even if we give manufacturers 
the benefit of the doubt, their legal actions will still lead to excessive drug 
costs and unfairness because of the existing reimbursement system. Part 
IV proposes a theoretically superior reimbursement system that 
acknowledges the potential societal value of off-label drug 
reimbursement. Part V discusses how the FCA can be used as an interim 
claw-back solution to reduce excessive drug costs. Part VI addresses some 
concerns about this expanded use of the FCA, and Part VII is the 
conclusion. 
II. Background on Off-label Drugs and Medicare Part D 
The United States healthcare system attracts extensive criticism for its 
high costs and comparatively inferior results.17 Medicare provided nearly 
six hundred billion dollars in benefits in 2014.18 Critics often point to 
expensive pharmaceuticals as contributing to high U.S. healthcare costs.19 
Nonetheless, manufacturers generally defend high pharmaceutical prices 
by citing the need for expensive research to develop safe and effective 
 
17. See, e.g., America’s Big Spending on Health Care Doesn’t Pay Off, ECONOMIST (Nov. 
16, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/21678669-americas-big-spending-
health-care-doesnt-pay; David Squires & Chloe Anderson, U.S. Health Care from 
a Global Perspective: Spending, Use of Services, Prices, and Health in 13 
Countries, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Oct. 8, 2015), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2015/oct/us-
health-care-from-a-global-perspective; Olga Khazan, U.S. Healthcare: Most 
Expensive and Worst Performing, ATLANTIC (Jun. 16, 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/06/us-healthcare-most-
expensive-and-worst-performing/372828/. 
18. See also KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 2. 
19. See Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services, supra note 3; Chad Terhune, 
Specialty Drug Costs Soar 32% to $438 Million at CalPERS Amid Uproar Over 
Prices, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-calpers-
drug-costs-20151215-story.html; Jonathan D. Rockoff, Rising Drug Costs to Be in 
Focus at Congressional Hearing, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 5, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/rising-drug-costs-to-be-in-focus-at-congressional-
hearing-1449311407. 
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drugs.20 Medicare reimburses for prescription drugs through numerous 
mechanisms; this article focuses upon a particular flaw in Medicare Part D 
reimbursement. 
Medicare Part D covers outpatient prescription drugs, also known as 
self-administered prescription drugs. Part D expenditures were ninety-five 
billion dollars in 2016, amounting to roughly thirteen percent of overall 
Medicare benefit payments.21 CMS has acknowledged that total Part D 
costs per capita have been rising at a troubling eleven-percent rate.22 Part 
of the core problem with Part D spending is that, while reimbursements 
are legally limited to drugs provided for medically accepted indications, 
there is no systemic mechanism to ensure that drugs are actually 
prescribed for such an indication.23 The written prescription contains no 
direct link between the drug and the indication for which it was prescribed 
under Part D.24 A physician will diagnose a patient with a certain condition 
and then prescribe a drug to treat that condition, but the prescription 
itself simply specifies the drug and dosage information. The patient then 
brings the prescription to a pharmacist who fills the prescription and files 
paperwork for reimbursement to Medicare. 
CMS manages Part D, but much of the execution is delegated to 
Medicare Part D sponsors: private insurance companies.25 Each plan 
sponsor has substantial autonomy in the coverage of Medicare Part D 
patients.26 By delegating such authority to sponsors, Medicare attempts to 
benefit from the private competitive market. These sponsors can compete 
to provide superior drug coverage to patients while also competing to 
hold drug costs down.27 The sponsors decide upon formularies, which are 
the lists of drugs covered by the sponsor. The sponsors may set different 
levels of cost-sharing with patients. For example, sponsors decide on 
 
20. See, e.g., Anna Edney, Sarepta Stock Rises to Highest Since 2013 as Drug 
Approved, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sept. 19, 2016), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-19/sarepta-wins-approval-
for-duchenne-drug-after-long-fda-review. 
21. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 2; see also KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra 
note 2. 
22. See Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services, supra note 3. 
23. OIG PART D REIMBURSEMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 1. 
24. See id. at 5. 
25. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT 
POL’Y 359-60 (Mar. 2014), available at http://www.medpac.gov/docs/default-
source/reports/mar14_entirereport.pdf?sfvrsn=0 [hereinafter MEDPAC 2014]. 
26. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE AND THE 
HEATH CARE DELIVERY SYSTEM 157-158 (June 2016), available at 
http://www.medpac.gov/docs/default-source/reports/chapter-6-improving-
medicare-part-d-june-2016-report-.pdf [hereinafter MEDPAC 2016]. 
27. See MEDPAC 2014, supra note 25, at 362-363. (noting that the sponsors have had 
some success in reducing drug prices when generic competition was available, 
but face challenges when drugs are unique treatments). 
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patient copays for particular tiers of drugs and negotiate drug prices and 
fees with pharmacies, along with rebates from manufacturers. 
Sponsors receive a variety of payments from Medicare.28 The core 
payment is the direct subsidy, a monthly payment to sponsors, adjusted 
for individual enrollee risk.29 Medicare also pays for eighty percent of drug 
spending that exceeds the out-of-pocket threshold for any patient;30 this 
payment is known as reinsurance. The third major payment is the low-
income subsidy (“LIS”) through which Medicare covers enrollee costs for 
those who would have trouble paying for coverage.31 
To be clear, physicians are free to exercise their own judgment in 
prescribing drugs for various conditions; the FDA does not want to be seen 
as interfering with a physician’s practice of medicine.32 Similarly, CMS’s 
focus is not upon physician decision-making, but on managing drug 
reimbursement for Medicare, and the agency’s decision is heavily 
entwined with the FDA’s processes. I begin with a discussion of the FDA’s 
drug approval process. 
A. FDA Approval of Drugs 
Before pharmaceuticals enter into interstate commerce, the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) requires FDA approval for specific 
uses, including indication, population, dosage, and duration.33 To obtain 
FDA approval, manufacturers must demonstrate the safety and efficacy of 
a new drug for each intended use or indication.34 Pharmaceutical 
manufacturers pay for scientific studies to establish the safety and efficacy 
of the drugs for particular indications. In deciding whether to approve a 
new drug, the FDA compares the drug’s benefits against its risks by asking 
whether the drug offers sufficient benefits to justify the risk of side 
effects.35 
Once approved, the FDCA requires manufacturers to label the drug in 
a fashion consistent with the FDA-approved usage. The FDA similarly 
places limits on manufacturers’ promotional activities regarding the drugs. 
Physicians, however, do not fall within the FDA’s jurisdiction. Physicians 
 
28. See id. at 375. 
29. See id; see also id. at 362 (explaining how there are also risk corridors that 
address market-based risks as opposed to individual patient risk). 
30. See MEDPAC 2016, supra note 26, at 174. 
31. See id. at 157. 
32. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 349-51 (2001). 
33. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012). 
34. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012); see also Weinberger v. Hynson, 412 U.S. 609, 612–14, 
(1973). 
35. Bruce Patsner, Marketing Approval Versus Cost of New Medical Technologies in 
the Era of Comparative Effectiveness: CMS, not FDA, Will Be the Primary Player, 3 
J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 38, 55 (2010). 
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are free to prescribe an approved drug in a manner that differs from the 
approved usage.36 Prescribing a drug for an alternative usage is known as 
off-label prescription. 
Off-label prescription is common, potentially comprising over twenty 
percent of prescriptions.37 Off-label usage is particularly frequent in 
psychiatry, oncology, and pediatrics.38 The U.S. General Accounting 
Office39 (“GAO”) found that one third of cancer drugs were off-label and 
that more than half of all cancer patients received at least one drug for an 
off-label indication.40 Patients with rare diseases—also called orphan 
diseases—are also often dependent on off-label uses for their treatment 
because the number of patients with each orphan disease is often too low 
to justify the tremendous expense associated with seeking FDA approval 
for those indications.41 Approximately twenty-one percent of all drugs 
prescribed to treat orphan diseases are off-label. 42 
B. Government reimbursement for off-label drug usage 
The fact that the FDA has not approved a drug for an off-label 
indication is not determinative as to reimbursement eligibility. CMS 
decides whether or not to reimburse for a drug and at what price to 
reimburse for a drug.43 Historically, CMS would generally reimburse for a 
drug that the FDA had approved, but the two agencies’ decisions have 
shown some divergence more recently.44 Aside from differences in 
standards and procedures, CMS’s mission explicitly incorporates financial 
security; cost-effectiveness is a consideration beyond the benefits and risk 
of the drug.45 CMS will consider off-label uses and clinical data that are not 
part of the FDA approval process, which leads to CMS approval of a drug 
for an indication that has not received FDA approval.46 Conversely, if the  
36. See 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2012). 
37. See David C. Radley et al., Off-Label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 
166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1023 (2006). 
38. Muriel R. Gillick, Controlling Off-Label Medication Use, 150 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 
344, 344 (2009); see also Marc A. Rodwin, Rooting Out Institutional Corruption to 
Manage Off-Label Use, 41 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 654, 656 (2013). 
39. Now known as the Government Accountability Office. 
40. U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/PEMD-91-14, OFF-LABEL DRUGS: REIMBURSEMENT 
POLICIES CONSTRAIN PHYSICIANS IN THEIR CHOICE OF CANCER THERAPIES 3 (1991), available 
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/151121.pdf. 
41. Bryan A. Liang & Tim Mackey, Reforming Off-Label Promotion to Enhance 
Orphan Disease Treatment, 327 SCI. 273, 273 (2010). 
42. Id. 
43. See Patsner, supra note 35, at 41. 
44. See id. at 43. 
45. See id. at 55. 
46. See id. at 56 (citing Jeffrey A Kelman, M.D., Chief Medical Officer, Center for 
Beneficiary Choices, CMS). 
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costs of an FDA-approved drug are too high and the drug does not provide 
a superior benefit-risk calculus compared to existing competitors, CMS 
might decline to cover the FDA-approved drug.47 
Patient-administered drugs fall under Medicare Part D, in contrast to 
professionally administered drugs under Part A and Part B.48 Also known 
as outpatient drugs, these patient-administered drugs are first prescribed 
by a physician. The patient then typically brings the prescription to a 
pharmacy that fills the prescription and bills the insurer, here Medicare 
Part D. While the patient’s medical records with the physician contain the 
patient’s diagnosis, the prescription that the pharmacy sees does not. 
Thus, under Part D, reimbursement is linked to the price of the drug and 
not to the patient’s diagnosis.49 The government knows the price of the 
drug to be reimbursed under Part D, but it does not explicitly know why 
the patient should be taking that drug.50 
As a formal matter, for outpatient drug claims to qualify for Medicare 
Part D reimbursement, the drugs must be provided for medically accepted 
indications. Medically accepted indications include both uses approved by 
FDA and uses supported by one or more of three publications, known as 
compendia, specified in section 1927(g)(1)(B)(i) of the Social Security 
Act.51 Medically accepted indications may also be established through 
Local Coverage Decisions, by which CMS contracts with private 
organizations to make regionally limited decisions. Finally, CMS also 
establishes medically accepted indications through annually published 
National Coverage Decisions.52 
To summarize, some off-label use of drugs may be reimbursable 
under Medicare Part D, but since the drugs are prescribed and reimbursed 
without a direct link to the diagnosis, CMS does not immediately know 
whether the drug prescription is legally reimbursable. 
 
47. See id. at 57. 
48. See Which Part of Medicare Will Cover My Prescription Drugs (A, B, or D)?, 
MEDICARE INTERACTIVE, https://www.medicareinteractive.org/get-
answers/medicare-covered-services/prescription-drugs/which-part-of-medicare-
will-cover-my-prescription-drugs-a-b-or-d (last visited Nov. 20, 2016); While this 
article focuses on Medicare Part D, it should be noted that Medicaid rules for 
off-label drug reimbursement are similar, and much of the article’s reasoning can 
thus be applied to Medicaid reimbursement. See, e.g., United States ex rel. 
Franklin v. Parke-Davis, No. Civ. A. 96-11651PBS, 2003 WL 22048255 at *3 (D. 
Mass. Aug. 22, 2003). 
49. See OIG PART D REIMBURSEMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 5. 
50. See id. at 5-6. 
51. Id. at 1. 
52. See Sandra J. Carnahan, Medicare’s Coverage with Study Participation Policy: 
Clinical Trials or Tribulations?, 7 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 229, 236-37 
(2007). 
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C. Criticism of manufacturers 
Criticism relating to off-label drug usage has generally focused upon 
the role of manufacturers.53 Manufacturers do not prescribe drugs, but 
they certainly develop and promote drugs. In an oft-cited example, the 
manufacturer of Neurontin, an FDA-approved epilepsy drug, pursued an 
off-label marketing strategy that brought in over two billion dollars a year 
with roughly ninety percent of Neurontin prescriptions for off-label use.54 
Commentators and courts criticize manufacturers for egregious 
promotional efforts, including practices such as giving misleading 
information about drugs to physicians and offering them bribes and 
kickbacks.55 Manufacturers may be supporting the publication and 
dissemination of articles that suggest off-label drug usage with insufficient 
scientific support.56 Excessive off-label drug promotion and usage 
threatens to circumvent public oversight of drug safety and efficacy.57 Off-
label drug use itself may be dangerous and ineffective, and manufacturers 
may be exacerbating the problem through their off-label promotional 
efforts.58 
As noted earlier, physicians may freely prescribe off-label,59 but there 
are restrictions on manufacturers’ ability to promote off-label usage of 
their products. The FDA allows manufacturers to distribute copies of peer-
reviewed journal articles discussing off-label usage, but summarizing such 
articles might subject manufacturers to prosecution.60 Manufacturers may 
also be allowed to discuss off-label usage in response to unsolicited 
 
53. See, e.g., Barry Meier, Narcotic Maker Guilty of Deceit Over Marketing, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 11, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/11/business/11drug.html; 
See also Rodwin, supra note 38, at 657. 
54. See In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. 04-CV-10739-PBS, 2011 WL 
3852254, at *6-*8 (D. Mass. Aug. 31, 2011) aff’d, 712 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2013). 
55. See, e.g., Meier, supra note 53; Rodwin, supra note 38, at 657. 
56. See Rodwin, supra note 38, at 656; see also Sergio Sismondo, Key Opinion 
Leaders and the Corruption of Medical Knowledge: What the Sunshine Act Will 
and Won’t Cast Light On, 41 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 1, 640 (2013). 
57. See Rodwin, supra note 38, at 659. 
58. See Richard C. Ausness, ‘There’s Danger Here, Cherie!’: Liability for the Promotion 
and Marketing of Drugs and Medical Devices for Off-Label Uses, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 
1253, 1324-25 (2008) (discussing dangers found with off-label usage of fen-phen, 
Letrozole, and Actimmune); but see Sandra H. Johnson, Polluting Medical 
Judgment? False Assumptions in the Pursuit of False Claims Regarding Off-Label 
Prescribing, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 63-65 (2008) (arguing that inappropriate 
relationships between manufacturers and physicians does not necessarily 
indicate that the off-label usage itself is inappropriate). 
59. See 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2012). 
60. See John C. Richter & Daniel C. Sale, The Future of Off-Label Promotion 
Enforcement in the Wake of Caronia- Toward a First Amendment Safe Harbor, 14 
SEDONA CONF. J. 19, 26 (2013). 
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requests from physicians.61 The FDA has been criticized for offering 
insufficiently clear guidance as to appropriate promotional behavior 
regarding off-label drug usage.62 
If manufacturers improperly promote off-label usage, they can be 
held criminally culpable for misbranding under the FDCA.63 The 
government has repeatedly convicted pharmaceutical companies and 
their representatives based on their off-label promotional activities.64 As 
discussed further in Part V, manufacturers also face sanctions for off-label 
promotion under the False Claims Act. 
If Medicare did not reimburse for off-label drug usage, the 
government would not be providing a direct incentive for manufacturers 
to promote off-label usage.65 Both CMS and states have acknowledged, 
though, that there are some off-label uses that are beneficial, and there 
are, therefore, benefits to legal reimbursement for some off-label 
prescriptions.66 Complicating matters is that the government often has 
weak and incomplete information regarding off-label drug usage and may 
not even know when reimbursements are for off-label usage.67 The 
Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”) has already proposed a clear reform to improve tracking of off-
label usage, allowing CMS to determine promptly whether 
reimbursements are appropriate.68 As proposed in Part IV, this reform 
should be supplemented by tying reimbursement rates to the indication 
for which a drug is used, rather than to only the drug itself. 
The tension between a regulatory scheme that attempts to restrict 
manufacturers’ encouragement of off-label drug usage while 
acknowledging the value in physicians prescribing off-label drug usage has 
manifested in various judicial decisions.69 The Supreme Court recognized 
that off-label prescribing “is an accepted and necessary corollary of the 
FDA’s mission to regulate.”70 While Neurontin’s manufacturer was fined 
for its off-label marketing efforts, the FDA also approved some off-label 
 
61. Id.  
62. See, e.g., Sarah Chacko, Drugmakers Await FDA Guidance on ‘Off-Label’ Uses of 
Medicines, THEHILL (Dec. 19, 2016), http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/311061-
drugmakers-await-fda-guidance-on-off-label-uses-of-medicines. 
63. 21 U.S.C. § 333(a) (2012). 
64. See, e.g., United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2012). 
65. See Ausness, supra note 58, at 1325-1326. 
66. See OIG PART D REIMBURSEMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 2. 
67. See id. at 1. 
68. See id. at 6. 
69. See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 349 (2001); See, 
e.g., Caronia, 703 F.3d 153-169. 
70. Buckman Co., 531 U.S. at 350. 
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uses of Neurontin.71 Courts have debated the importance of scientific 
truth in manufacturer’s promotional efforts,72 but this is typically difficult 
in off-label cases, because the FDA itself does not know the truth about 
whether a drug’s off-label use is effective, and it is unlikely that a court 
could do better than an expert agency in evaluating drug effectiveness.73 
III. An Inherently Flawed Reimbursement System Drives Excessive 
Costs 
The present focus on scientific truth and punishing deceptive 
manufacturer behavior overlooks the broader problem: because the 
present reimbursement system is flawed, all profit-seeking behavior 
contributes to excessive reimbursements under Medicare Part D. Given 
the system’s present design, Medicare will end up spending excessively on 
off-label conditions, and even honest manufacturers will naturally over-
invest in driving off-label drug usage. 
Focusing on manufacturer violations of pharmaceutical promotional 
rules may help limit disinformation, but it is unlikely to stem the tide of 
excessive reimbursements under Medicare Part D. Manufacturers can 
follow every rule and regulation regarding off-label promotion and they 
will still have every incentive to over-invest in encouraging and developing 
off-label drug usage. Investment is a broad concept covering a 
manufacturer’s behavior in pursuing revenue from off-label drugs; it 
includes research into off-label efficacy, for example, and it is not limited 
to promotional behavior that directly engages physicians. This over-
investment will continue to drive excessive Part D reimbursements. 
This part demonstrates the danger of this over-investment 
contributing to excessive Medicare reimbursements. The article here 
makes every assumption in favor of manufacturers and demonstrates 
that, nonetheless, the present system will continue to drive excessive drug 
reimbursement levels. The situation may actually be worse in reality, given 
that manufacturers may not always act in the public interest as assumed 
here. 
A. A standard for excessive costs 
Analyzing excessive costs begins with a general principle that drug 
costs are excessive if they exceed the social benefit obtained from a 
patient utilizing the drug. If there is no scientific evidence that a drug is 
 
71. See In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. 04-CV-10739-PBS, 2011 WL 
3852254, at *1-*2 (D. Mass. Aug. 31, 2011) aff’d, 712 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2013). 
72. See, e.g., Caronia, 703 F.3d at 166-67; See Mark Ratner & Trisha Gura, Off-Label 
or Off-Limits?, 26 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 867, 873-74 (2008). 
73. See Christopher Robertson, When Truth Cannot Be Presumed: The Regulation of 
Drug Promotion Under an Expanding First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 545, 560 
(2014) (“FDA defers to physician discretion to prescribe off label, because it 
remains ignorant about safety and efficacy claims until they are proven.”). 
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safe and effective for an off-label condition, then any Medicare spending 
on that drug for that off-label condition is excessive. This would be the 
archetype of purely wasteful spending, as patients do not benefit at all 
from taking unsafe, ineffective drugs.74 At the other end of the spectrum 
are FDA-approved drugs for the treatment of an on-label condition for 
which CMS is willing to reimburse. Given that cost-benefit analysis is part 
of CMS’s approval process,75 it is safe to presume that spending on such 
drugs for the on-label condition is not excessive. 
Drugs prescribed for off-label conditions will fall somewhere along 
this spectrum. Some drugs may have an extremely limited number of 
scientific studies supporting their efficacy for off-label conditions—those 
drugs will fall closer to the wasteful end of the spectrum. Other drugs may 
have excellent studies supporting the off-label usage—these drugs will lie 
close to the FDA-approved on-label end. There is therefore some optimal 
level of Medicare spending on the drug for the off-label condition that 
balances the costs of the drug against the benefits patients may obtain 
from the drug. Note that this optimal level of Medicare spending is 
specific to a drug-condition combination. If a drug can treat two distinct 
conditions, there will be an optimal level of Medicare spending for 
condition A and a separate optimal level of spending for condition B. 
Similarly, if a condition can be treated by two distinct drugs, there will be 
an optimal level of spending for drug X for that condition and a separate 
optimal level of spending for drug Y for the same condition. 
Expanding this analysis, consider that Medicare spending on drugs has 
at least two related purposes. First, CMS has an immediate interest in 
ensuring that patients receive safe, effective treatment that is presently 
available. Second, CMS has a long-term interest in manufacturers 
producing new safe and effective drugs. 
Regarding CMS’s immediate interest in ensuring that patients receive 
treatment, an optimal level of spending corresponds to the safety and 
effectiveness of the drugs. If the drug is highly beneficial to patients 
suffering from a costly condition, the optimal level of spending would 
likely be higher. If a drug produces only limited benefits for a small portion 
of patients suffering a mild condition, the optimal level of spending may 
be lower. If there are two potential drugs for the treatment of one 
condition and they are identical in safety and effectiveness, any spending 
on the more expensive drug is excessive unless there is some other 
justification for such spending. For example, CMS might value having 
competition in the market supply of the drugs.76 To maintain the viability 
 
74. If the drug is actually harmful to patients, society should actually invest in 
preventing access to such drugs, even if they were free to the Medicare system. 
75. See Patnser, supra note 35, at 55. 
76. This competitive interest may be linked to CMS’s below long-term interest in 
new drug development. Competition may also be important in negotiating prices 
for existing drugs. 
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of the manufacturer producing the more expensive but otherwise 
identical drug, CMS might agree to reimburse for some limited level of the 
more expensive drug. Spending may be excessive if it is heavily 
concentrated on relatively ineffective drugs when safe, more effective 
alternatives are available. 
CMS’s long-term interest in manufacturers producing new safe and 
effective drugs interacts with its immediate interest in patient treatment. 
A naïve method of compensating manufacturers for drugs would be to 
reimburse at the marginal cost of production for those drugs. 
Manufacturers, in theory, would continue to produce existing drugs, but 
such a strategy would strip out the profit incentive for future drug 
research and development. The reimbursement rates for drugs thus must 
be sufficiently high to induce manufacturers to conduct ongoing research 
and development of drugs. Excessive spending, considering CMS’s long-
term interest in ongoing research, could come in the form of market 
distortion. For example, CMS’s willingness to reimburse for a high-priced 
drug is a signal to the marketplace that there is a strong need for safe, 
effective treatment of the particular condition the drug treats. CMS would 
expect manufacturers to react to the high price signal by investing in new 
drug development for that particular condition. If CMS is reimbursing for a 
high-priced drug, but there is already a safe, equally effective, and lower-
cost treatment for the same condition, CMS expenditures on the high-
priced drug might induce other manufacturers to continue emphasizing 
drug research for that same condition. Such expenditures and investments 
might be excessive, as the existence of the lower-cost option would 
suggest that other conditions should be research priorities. Under these 
principles, CMS should place the strongest reimbursement incentives 
upon FDA-approved drug treatments for on-label conditions. These are 
drugs that have crossed a threshold of scientific evidence in establishing 
safety and efficacy for certain conditions. At the other end, if there is no 
scientific evidence of safety and efficacy for the treatment of another 
condition, there should be no Medicare reimbursement for that drug-
condition combination. 
In between, a drug for which there is limited scientific evidence of off-
label efficacy should receive an intermediate level of reimbursement 
incentive. If CMS were to allow reimbursement at the same level as an 
FDA-approved on-label treatment, there would be no incentive for the 
manufacturer to continue research and testing to satisfy FDA standards 
for an off-label use. If CMS were to prohibit any reimbursement for this 
intermediate case, patients might not have access to the drug. Allowing 
intermediate reimbursement strikes a balance for patients who might 
benefit from a drug that has not completed scientific-efficacy studies; 
those patients will receive the drug, but the manufacturer will not receive 
more reimbursement than a competing manufacturer that has completed 
those scientific studies demonstrating efficacy. 
There are thus multiple criteria by which Medicare drug expenditures 
may be excessive. This section is not a comprehensive list of parameters in 
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determining optimal Medicare spending on off-label drugs, nor is this a 
claim that society can necessarily establish the precise, optimal level of 
spending on any particular drug. Rather, it is rather a claim that there are 
different levels of scientific evidence supporting the efficacy of drugs and 
that it is excessive to spend more money for drugs that have lower levels 
of scientific evidence supporting their efficacy. The Medicare spending 
framework will have a tendency to drive patients, physicians, and 
manufacturers to either better levels of spending that are closer to 
optimal or worse levels of spending that stray further from optimal. 
B. Even an idealized manufacturer contributes to excessive drug 
reimbursement under the present system. 
The next step in analyzing off-label drug costs under Medicare Part D 
is to consider manufacturer behavior. Instead of focusing on manufacturer 
misbehavior, a problem both courts and commentators have discussed at 
length,77 this section discusses the impact of ethical profit-seeking 
manufacturers on Medicare Part D off-label expenditures. While unethical, 
avaricious manufacturers can cause excessive drug expenditures, this 
section demonstrates that even ethical profit-seeking manufacturers 
within the existing reimbursement framework lead to excessive Part D off-
label expenditures. 
One beginning premise is that off-label drug usage is, in the short 
term, good for society.78 Doctors can be trusted to treat their patients 
properly, and if a doctor believes that prescribing a drug for an off-label 
use is a good choice, this section assumes that the patient will benefit 
from taking that drug. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that 
physicians are limited in their availability and capacity to learn about new 
drug uses.79 Physicians do not instantaneously learn about new drug uses; 
they have limited time to both treat patients and study new treatment 
developments. Moreover, physicians have very limited information 
regarding drug prices.80 
 
77. See supra Part II.C. 
78. See 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2012). While the FDA’s lack of involvement in physician off-
label prescription can be described as a reluctance to interfere with the practice 
of medicine, this similarly suggests that there are positive aspects to off-label 
prescription. If a particular off-label prescription were generating consistently 
bad outcomes for patients, it is difficult to believe that a regulatory agency 
would not take action. 
79. See Puneet Manchanda & Elisabeth Honka, The Effects and Role of Direct-to-
Physician Marketing in the Pharmaceutical Industry: An Integrative Review, 2 
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 785, 785-87 (2005); see also Adriane Fugh-Berman 
& Shahram Ahari, Following the Script: How Drug Reps Make Friends and 
Influence Doctors, 4 PLOS MED. 621, 623-24 (2007). 
80. See PETER TEMIN, TAKING YOUR MEDICINE: DRUG REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 102-06 
(1980). 
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The second assumption is that pharmaceutical firms are broadly 
acting in the public interest.81 This assumption automatically rules out 
deliberate lies and deception regarding off-label drug usage. Moreover, 
this implies that any increased investment that the firms make in off-label 
research corresponds to increased public good. For example, this means 
that if a firm increases its spending on off-label research, it conducts 
legitimate clinical research on safety and efficacy and it disseminates the 
results of that research. 
The third premise of this section is a focus on off-label usage of a 
patent-protected drug in a market of patent-protected drugs.82 Once 
patent protection expires, competition from generics and other 
manufacturers may reduce prices and may even provide insufficient 
incentive for off-label research.83 Thus, in this section, the market price of 
drugs refers specifically to the competitive market of patent-protected 
drugs. 
1. Manufacturer pricing 
First consider the manufacturer’s pricing mechanism. After 
completing scientific studies and obtaining FDA approval for a drug, how 
does a manufacturer set the price of its patent-protected drug? As many 
have acknowledged, manufacturers set prices at whatever the market will 
bear.84 This is standard profit-seeking behavior, and this piece is not 
criticism of such behavior. Following general market theory, the drug will 
be sold for a price that corresponds to the benefits that a patient expects 
to receive from the drug. In other words, a drug that offers little benefit 
will not command a high price. 
Rather, the challenge leading to excessive Medicare reimbursements 
is that the manufacturer will set the drug price at a level tied solely to the 
market for the on-label condition.85 There is little reason to believe that 
the market for a drug’s off-label condition will be tightly linked to the 
 
81. Cf. Keith B. Leffler, Persuasion or Information? The Economics of Prescription 
Drug Advertising, 24 J.L. & ECON. 45, 55 (1981) (drawing dichotomy of firms’ 
advertising efforts as either informative or persuasive & uninformative, but not 
actually deceptive). 
82. For a brief discussion of this unique environment, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The 
Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 717, 720 (2005). 
83. There is empirical data to suggest, however, that drug prices even with generic 
competition may not necessarily be lower. See Panos Kanavos, Joan Costa-Font 
& Elizabeth Seeley, Competition in Off-Patent Drug Markets: Issues, Regulation 
and Evidence, 23 ECON. POLICY 500, 500-01 (July 2008). 
84. See Sham Mailankody & Vinay Prasad, Five Years of Cancer Drug Approvals: 
Innovation, Efficacy, and Costs, 1 J. AMER. MED. ASS’N. ONCOLOGY 539, 540 (2015). 
85. The present Medicare Part D reimbursement system does not have visibility into 
the treated condition, thus limiting downward pressure on pricing. As I discuss 
later in Part VI, though, it is possible that market pressures outside of the 
Medicare system may create price pressure on the manufacturer. 
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market for the on-label condition.86 To the extent that the market price 
for drugs treating the off-label condition is actually lower, Medicare 
reimbursement based on drug prescription independent of condition will 
be excessive. 
For example, begin with a firm that has obtained FDA approval for a 
new drug X for the treatment of condition A. It sets the price for drug X by 
evaluating the market of treatments for condition A. If existing treatments 
for condition A are limited, expensive, and not particularly effective, the 
firm may be able to charge a high price for drug X. Assume that the firm 
charges $5000 per dose of drug X given the market for condition A. 
Parallel research determines an off-label use for drug X in treating 
condition B, but the market for condition B is much more competitive. 
Even if the firm obtained FDA approval of drug X for treating condition B, 
the firm believes it could only charge fifty dollars per dose of drug X if it 
were selling drug X solely for the treatment of condition B. 
In this scenario, Medicare reimbursement for drug X at the $5000 
price for an off-label treatment of condition B is excessive. This claim is 
based on the assumption that market prices are a proxy for the harm 
associated with the treated condition.87 If the market price for the off-
label condition is significantly lower, it implies that the harm from the off-
label condition is significantly lower. Thus, Medicare expenditure at the 
higher drug price for condition B is likely excessive. 
It is nonetheless possible that the drug could be worth the full price of 
reimbursement, regardless of indication. In the above example, even 
though the $5000 per dose price is linked to the on-label condition, it is 
theoretically possible that an educated consumer would be willing to pay 
that price for the off-label condition.88 We might think a physician would 
 
86. This depends, of course, on the type of off-label scenario at play. Some types of 
off-label usage involve patient groups that have not been adequately addressed 
in studies (i.e., drugs not tested on children under the age of two). See Alexandra 
Ossola, FDA Allows Company To Market Drug For Off-Label Use: Some Experts 
Predict That More Companies Will Try To Do The Same, POPULAR SCIENCE (Mar. 10, 
2016), http://www.popsci.com/fda-allows-company-to-market-drug-for-off-
label-use; see also COMMITTEE ON ACCELERATING RARE DISEASES RESEARCH AND ORPHAN 
PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT, BOARD ON HEALTH SCIENCES POLICY, RARE DISEASES AND ORPHAN 
PRODUCTS: ACCELERATING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 192 (2010). 
87. The assumption that market prices are a relative proxy for harm assumes that 
there is some rationality in the marketplace. This assumption is more credible as 
a proxy for the minimum level of harm caused by a condition: a patient, 
insurance carrier, or physician would not purchase the drug if the harm of the 
condition did not exceed the price of the drug. In contrast, it is possible that the 
harm of the condition greatly outweighs the price of the drug, and the consumer 
is getting a great deal by paying a low price to remove a great harm. See Richard 
E. Caves et al., Patent Expiration, Entry, and Competition in the U.S. 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 1991 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: 
MICROECONOMICS 1, 7 (1991). 
88. See id. at 5 (describing patients as unlikely to select physicians based on the 
physicians’ drug prescription behavior). 
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be best suited to make such a determination. In reality, of course, most 
physicians are not aware of the particular price or reimbursement rates of 
drugs,89 but they at least may be aware of insurance coverage and the 
ability of patients to actually obtain prescribed drugs. Even if, in the short 
term, this off-label drug is worth the full price of reimbursement, the next 
section describes the method by which improper incentives drive 
excessive drug costs. 
As a final note, while this article focuses on utilitarian concerns, there 
is also an underlying fairness concern that supports this argument. To the 
extent that there are already drugs that are effective in treating condition 
B that have obtained FDA approval for the condition, it seems inequitable 
to allow drug X, which has not obtained FDA approval for condition B, to 
receive a higher price for treating condition B. 
2. Manufacturer investment 
One possible criticism of the aforementioned concern with 
manufacturer pricing is that costs may balance out; sometimes Medicare 
pays an excessive amount for an off-label treatment, but sometimes 
Medicare gets a good deal because the off-label drug is actually cheaper 
than the competitive products for the off-label condition. 
This leads to the next problem: the manufacturer’s response to this 
incentive structure. The above costs are unlikely to balance out because of 
the manufacturer’s investment decisions given a pharmaceutical market 
with manufacturers setting prices as described in the prior section. 
Broadly speaking, manufacturers that see the opportunity to profit from 
off-label usage are likely to invest in off-label usage, but if Medicare is 
instead getting a good deal, it is unlikely that manufacturers will similarly 
invest in such off-label usage. 
Following the earlier example, begin with a manufacturer that has 
obtained FDA approval for drug X in treating condition A. At this point, 
there may be zero scientific evidence regarding the efficacy of the drug for 
the off-label condition B. The optimal spending on research into drug X’s 
efficacy in treating condition B depends on two factors: first, the 
manufacturer’s beliefs about the future efficacy of such research, and 
second, the size of the market for condition B. 
It is possible that those factors will lead the manufacturer to actually 
obtain FDA approval of drug X for condition B. Since this paper discusses 
off-label usage, though, I assume that either the market for condition B or 
the cost of the research somehow makes obtaining FDA approval for drug 
X for condition B infeasible for the firm.90 Nonetheless, because of the 
 
89. See TEMIN, supra note 80, at102-06. 
90. It is also possible that the manufacturer may be unwilling to invest in the 
necessary research because of the risk of discovering some side-effects that 
would jeopardize its original FDA-approved indication. See COMMITTEE ON 
ACCELERATING RARE DISEASES RESEARCH AND ORPHAN PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT, supra note 
88, at 192. 
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possibility of off-label usage and reimbursement, the firm will invest some 
non-zero amount into condition B research. Roughly speaking, the amount 
the firm invests into condition B research corresponds with the expected 
revenue from condition B reimbursement. If reimbursement for drug X is 
fixed regardless of condition, then the firm will invest in condition B 
research at a level corresponding to the price determined by condition 
A—in this example, $5000 per dose. 
Note, however, that the price of $5000 may have no correlation with 
the market for condition B. There may be already effective, patent-
protected drugs that treat condition B and have a significantly lower price, 
and drug X might not be any more effective. If the manufacturer estimates 
the market size for condition B using the $5000 per dose value, the market 
opportunity for condition B will be much greater than the market value 
based upon the present, lower-cost drugs available for condition B. 
Faced with this incentive structure, the manufacturer will over-invest, 
leading to societal losses. The price discrepancy is a distorted allocation of 
research funding.91 To the extent manufacturer investment is on research, 
this spending is misallocated; Medicare does not actually prioritize 
investments in condition B research at a level corresponding with a drug 
priced at $5000 per dose, and society would be better off if the 
manufacturer invested in other research. Stated another way, if the 
market price of a competitor drug in treating condition B is fifty dollars per 
dose, Medicare would not encourage manufacturers to invest at a market 
level corresponding to $5000 per dose for condition B; there are other 
conditions worthier of investment. From the drug X manufacturer’s 
perspective, though, there is a large revenue opportunity in pushing drug 
X for condition B. It is possible that drug X might actually be one hundred 
times more effective and safe in comparison to the existing competitors in 
treating condition B, but charging a hundred-times higher rate should 
require FDA approval. 
Note that an investment incentive problem still exists if the off-label 
market price is higher than the on-label market price; i.e., a fifty dollar per 
dose drug has an off-label use for which competitors are charging $5000 
per dose. In this situation, manufacturers face insufficient incentive to 
invest in off-label usage. The result will be insufficient research and 
promotion of cost-saving off-label drug usage. In other words, Medicare 
expenditures will be higher than optimal, as there will be relatively 
increased usage of the FDA-approved drugs for condition B and less-than-
optimal research and information supporting cheaper off-label drugs for 
condition B. 
A further complication is the fact that the manufacturer will split its 
investment in the off-label condition between research and promotion.92 
 
91. Some have described drug regulations as an incentive for producing knowledge 
about the drug. See Robertson, supra note 73, at 561. 
92. See, e.g., Caves, supra note 87, at 2. 
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Given that research has a downside,93 there is a serious risk that the 
investment may favor promotion over research. A manufacturer 
considering further research must consider the possibility that subsequent 
clinical research will reveal weaker results or worse side effects.94 Such 
negative clinical findings could jeopardize not only use of the drug for the 
off-label condition, but also its use for the on-label condition.95 The 
general problem here is that manufacturers may have a difficult time 
capturing benefits from further off-label research.96 If subsequent 
research reveals weaker results or worse side effects, society is better off 
learning about the weaker results or worse side effects. Unfortunately for 
the manufacturer, it is in the business of selling drugs and not information. 
When its research reveals these negative results, society benefits from the 
knowledge, but it is difficult for the manufacturer to profit from such 
negative knowledge. 
In contrast to research, manufacturers will likely capture much of the 
benefit from promotional activity. Promotional activity likely increases 
physician awareness and thus propensity to prescribe the manufacturer’s 
drug.97 Following the basic assumption that manufacturers do not act 
deceptively, society benefits from the increased physician knowledge.98 
The manufacturer will benefit from revenue due to the reimbursement for 
the prescribed drug. 
The fact that a physician learns about the drug’s off-label uses, 
however, does not automatically mean that increased promotional activity 
in distributing knowledge is universally desirable. Physicians have limited 
time and mental resources; learning new information is constrained by 
those resources.99 If physicians are limited in their time to listen to 
manufacturers’ reps, those physicians may disproportionately favor drugs 
 
93. See Robertson, supra note 73, at 559-60. 
94. Id. 
95. In 2004, Merck was forced to remove from the market its $2.5 billion Vioxx 
product, a drug approved for the treatment of arthritic pain, when clinical 
studies on an alternative treatment, preventing recurrence of colon polyps, 
revealed increased cardiovascular side effects from the drug. See Barbara 
Martinez et al., Merck Pulls Vioxx From Market After Link to Heart Problems, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 1, 2004), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB109654671320932405. 
96. See Robertson, supra note 73, at 561 (“Information is needed to make product 
markets perform optimally, but if sellers are to provide that information then 
they must be given an incentive to do so.”) (citing Howard Beales et al., The 
Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & Econ. 491, 504 (1981)). 
97. See, e.g., Caves supra note 87, at 5 (citing TEMIN, supra note 91) (describing 
physicians’ lack of “ready and well-organized information” regarding drug 
choices). 
98. See id. at 4-8. 
99. See id. at 5 (citing TEMIN, supra note 91) (describing physicians’ lack of “ready and 
well-organized information” regarding drug choices). 
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whose manufacturers dedicate greater promotional resources.100 
Regardless of the actual impact on physician prescriptions, there is the 
social loss of spending physician time on relatively weak scientific studies 
that do not rise to the same level of the studies supporting FDA-approved 
drugs and conditions. Stated another way, the result of increased 
manufacturer investment may be a lot of distracting noise that makes it 
more difficult for physicians to focus on relevant new information.101 
C. Existing limits to excessive off-label expenditures 
While off-label reimbursement is difficult to detect under the present 
Medicare Part D system, there are limits to manufacturers’ ability to profit 
in such a manner. 
One possible limitation is that off-label reimbursements might come 
to dominate on-label reimbursement. If only a small number of patients 
suffer from the on-label condition, but Medicare is paying for a much 
larger volume of the manufacturer’s drug, this would attract significant 
attention.102 Rather than identifying specific prescriptions that are for off-
label usage, the aggregate data would provide a conservative estimate of 
the off-label usage volume. If there are only 100,000 patients with 
condition A and Medicare is reimbursing for 500,000 patient-doses of drug 
X, CMS might reasonably be suspicious of drug X. The benign assumption 
is that such high levels of drug X reimbursement are due to off-label 
usage, but such high reimbursement might also be a signal of fraudulent 
billing. Either way, the suspicion could drive CMS to begin requiring 
preauthorization or other administrative controls on the prescription of 
the manufacturer’s drug. Such rules would not only limit off-label 
prescriptions of the drug but also hamper on-label prescriptions. 
Manufacturers would not want to attract such attention. They 
therefore might limit promotional efforts to avoid exceeding some 
threshold that could trigger CMS investigation.103 Given CMS’s general 
reluctance to take investigative steps, though, I assume that this upper 
 
100. Id. at 12 (describing large volume of advertisements as a “signal-jamming” 
strategy to fight competitor information). 
101. Id. 
102. For example, 83% of physician prescriptions for Gabapentin (Neurontin) were for 
off-label uses. David C. Radley et al., Off-Label Prescribing Among Office-Based 
Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1021 (2006). This led to subsequent 
litigation. See id. at 1026. 
103. More formally, a manufacturer would conduct research and promote the off-
label use of its drug until the marginal benefits from doing equaled the marginal 
costs of such research & promotion. Those marginal benefits would be severely 
reduced if CMS instituted investigations into its drug. See CTR. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., OFF-LABEL PHARMACEUTICAL MARKING: HOW TO RECOGNIZE AND REPORT IT 
(Oct. 2015), available at https://www.cms.gov/Medicare-Medicaid-
Coordination/Fraud-Prevention/Medicaid-Integrity-Education/Downloads/off-
label-marketing-factsheet.pdf. 
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limit to the manufacturer’s over-investment is not sufficiently low to 
justify non-intervention by other means. 
D. The role of sponsor competition 
The existence of multiple Part D sponsors increases the complexity of 
the manufacturer’s decision. First, simply to maximize profit and revenue 
from its drug, the manufacturer should ensure that its drug is included in 
all sponsors’ formularies. This could be accomplished by ensuring that the 
drug is part of Part D’s list of required drugs that every sponsor must 
include, or it could be accomplished through individual negotiation with 
each sponsor. Working from the assumption that the manufacturer’s drug 
can command a high price, it is reasonable to believe that there is little 
competition for the drug and its on-label treatment condition. With little 
or no competition, inclusion in formularies should be relatively 
straightforward. 
Uniform inclusion of the drug in all sponsors’ formularies is also 
important in protecting its off-label profitability. If the manufacturer fails 
to include the drug in a limited number of sponsors’ plans, the 
manufacturer may create a negative feedback cycle that will damage its 
off-label earning potential. This negative feedback cycle is triggered by the 
fact that a sponsor that does include the manufacturer’s drug will be at a 
relative disadvantage to a sponsor that does not include the 
manufacturer’s drug. A sponsor that includes the manufacturer’s drug for 
its on-label condition faces increased costs for the off-label condition. 
These increased costs may reduce that sponsor’s competitiveness in 
contrast with a sponsor that does not cover the manufacturer’s drug. Such 
reduced competitiveness may trigger the sponsor to conduct research 
that would identify the manufacturer’s drug as the cause of its 
comparatively higher costs. If all sponsors include the manufacturer’s drug 
in their formularies, though, there is less risk of this reduced 
competitiveness triggering investigation of the manufacturer. 
E. An instrumental need for off-label revenue 
Critics of the argument in III.B. might claim that off-label revenue is 
important in getting the drug out at all. It is possible that manufacturers 
rely upon the off-label revenue to support their investment in the FDA-
approval process for the on-label condition. The argument, then, is that 
the manufacturer would not even invest in the drug for any FDA approval, 
because it believes that there is insufficient potential revenue for the on-
label condition to justify its investment. This is an open empirical question, 
although there are commentators who argue that manufacturers 
overstate the actual investments necessary to develop FDA-approved 
drugs.104 
 
104. See, e.g., Donald W Light, Rebecca Warburton, Demythologizing the High Costs 
of Pharmaceutical Research, 6 Biosocieties 34, 34 (2011); See also Joseph A. 
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Another potential criticism is that manufacturers naturally under-
invest in off-label conditions. The threat of patent expiration and generic 
competition may generally induce under-investment in off-label research 
in patent-protected drugs.105 Thus, allowing for high reimbursement rates 
for off-label prescriptions provides an incentive for manufacturers to 
conduct a limited level of research prior to patent expiration, even if those 
manufacturers are not conducting sufficient research to satisfy FDA 
approval requirements. 
These arguments are of secondary importance. The present system 
obfuscates the connection between drugs and the conditions being 
treated. Moreover, the potential positive instrumental benefits of the 
existing system are due to chance: a drug happens to be effective for 
certain on-label and off-label conditions. The above goals can be better 
pursued via direct, more visible means of subsidy and promotion. 
 
*** 
In summary, the existing government reimbursement system for off-
label drug usage is inherently flawed. The improper incentives and unfair 
windfall profits will lead even scrupulous manufacturers to over-invest in 
off-label activity, resulting in excessive expenditures under Medicare Part 
D. 
IV. A theoretical solution: reimbursement linked to competitor 
pricing 
The above theoretical model focuses on excess drug expenditures 
resulting from the present system; in reality, there are more harms that 
may result. As discussed earlier, physicians might be insufficiently or 
improperly informed about the costs and benefits of off-label drug use, 
and manufacturers might not be completely honest and transparent in 
their promotional efforts. Patient health and safety may also be at risk. 
Because of those additional harms, some have suggested eliminating 
manufacturer profits from off-label prescriptions,106 proposing 
reimbursing off-label prescriptions at the marginal cost of production for 
the drug, which effectively eliminates any profit from the off-label 
prescription and sale.107 This proposal may be the best solution; a 
thorough analysis depends on the extent to which firms behave badly in 
response to the off-label incentives in comparison to the potentially good 
responses described in Part III. If the potential revenue from off-label drug 
usage drive manufacturers towards socially harmful activities that 
 
DiMasi et. al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development 
Costs, 22 J. OF HEALTH ECON. 151, 151 (2003). 
105. See, Caves, supra note 87, at 1-2. 
106. Rodwin, supra note 38, at 659-660. 
107. Id. at 659. 
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outweigh beneficial activities, then this proposal to eliminate any off-label 
reimbursement profit is the right solution. 
A. Capping reimbursement by reference to an FDA approved competitor 
If it is the case, however, that firms have the public interest in mind, 
eliminating all incentive for off-label efforts may be detrimental to society. 
Instead of reimbursing at the marginal cost of production, this article 
proposes that a fair reimbursement rate would be capped at a rate tied to 
the competitive, patent-protected market for treatment of the condition. 
Such a cap would ensure that patients would still have access to drugs for 
off-label indications, while improving manufacturers’ incentives for 
research. This cap could take multiple forms. 
One option that results in the greatest amount of fairness is to cap at 
the lowest-priced FDA approved competitor. Under such a system, a 
manufacturer who has not received FDA approval for the off-label 
condition could not receive reimbursement higher than any competitor 
who has received FDA approval for treatment of the condition. 
This would not eliminate the incentive for incremental off-label 
research and promotion. Instead, setting such a reimbursement rate 
would give manufacturers incentive to invest in some level of off-label 
research and promotion, but such incentive would be no greater than the 
incentive enjoyed by an FDA-approved competitor. 
An alternative cap would be to set the maximum reimbursement rate 
at the second-highest priced FDA-approved competitor. This might reduce 
some of the fairness of the first option, in that some FDA-approved 
competitors might receive a lower reimbursement rate than 
manufacturers who have not received FDA approval. Nonetheless, it is 
possible that this cap would provide superior incentives for manufacturers 
who had not obtained FDA approval. The lowest priced FDA-competitor 
may be a remarkably low-efficacy product that was approved at a time 
when no other treatments were available for the relevant indication. The 
newer off-label drug may be more comparable in efficacy to the best FDA-
approved drugs on the market. Allowing the off-label drug to be 
reimbursed at the second-highest FDA-approved competitor price may 
provide a better incentive despite the potential unfairness. Some auction 
theories suggest that this second-highest price may be a good choice.108 
There are other cap proposals that could be justified, such as a cap 
linked to the mean or median reimbursement rate of the FDA-approved 
competitors and there will be similar trade-offs between fairness and 
potential incentives. This article does not take a position as to the best 
particular cap. Rather, the important core is that the cap must somehow 
be linked to the market of FDA-approved competitors. 
 
108. See, e.g., William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed 
Tenders, 16 J. FIN. 8, 8 (1961). 
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B. An extended proposal: reimbursement tied to competitive indication 
The aforementioned cap proposal seeks to limit excessive Medicare 
Part D expenditures on off-label drugs that result from the presently 
flawed reimbursement system. There is a flip side to this discussion, 
though: the possibility that the flawed reimbursement system also 
benefits Medicare by obtaining cheaper off-label drugs. The prior section 
focused on scenarios in which the off-label drug commands a higher price 
than the prevailing FDA-approved competitors. There is also the possibility 
that the drug price is substantially lower than the competitive price for the 
off-label condition. Under the present system, to the extent the lower-
price drug is used for an off-label purpose and is safe and effective, 
Medicare is actually getting a good deal in the short term; the patient is 
receiving treatment at a substantially lower drug cost than she would have 
if she were receiving a drug approved for the condition. 
The arguments raised in Part III regarding incentives nonetheless 
apply in this situation, too. In this case, however, manufacturers may 
under-invest in off-label research under the present regime. Compared to 
companies that are looking into new, patentable drugs specifically for the 
off-label condition, manufacturers who have an existing drug at a 
relatively lower price will not invest as much because of their weakened 
ability to command a higher price. If the manufacturer unilaterally raises 
the price for all customers, they may receive tremendous pushback in the 
marketplace and negative media attention.109 Given the existing 
disconnect between diagnosis and prescription, though, manufacturers 
have no way of charging different prices to Medicare for the same drug. 
Manufacturers dealing with an existing drug will likely be stuck at the 
lower reimbursement rate of the on-label condition. 
Thus, a broader proposal would be to tie all reimbursement rates to 
the competitive indication rates. Medicare would thus reimburse for a 
specific indication rather than a specific drug. Rather than a physician 
prescribing a specific drug and the manufacturer receiving reimbursement 
at a negotiated price, all manufacturers would receive the same 
reimbursement price when their drug is used. A manufacturer in the 
above situation could then benefit from higher rates as long as the patient 
had the off-label condition, and such a manufacturer would then face 
comparable incentives for investment. 
In the short term, this extended proposal is likely to lead to higher 
Medicare drug expenditures in comparison with the above cap proposals, 
because it would allow a manufacturer to benefit from higher 
reimbursement rates if the price for the off-label condition is higher than 
the on-label reimbursement rate. In the long term, however, correction of 
this incentive problem should induce greater research for the off-label 
 
109. For example, consider the recent outcry regarding Mylan NV and its EpiPen price 
increase. See Louise Radnofsky, EpiPen Maker Executive to Testify at House 
Hearing, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 15, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/epipen-
maker-executive-to-testify-at-house-hearing-1473894399. 
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condition, resulting in greater manufacturer competition for the off-label 
condition and eventually lower prices. 
 
*** 
Note that these proposals to cap reimbursement rates fall under Part 
III’s theoretical model of an idealized manufacturer. To the extent there 
are additional harms, the cap should actually be lower. In fact, if the 
harms from off-label usage are sufficiently severe, even proposals to cap 
rates at the marginal cost of production may be insufficient. Rather than 
allowing reimbursement at the marginal cost of production, perhaps no 
reimbursement should be allowed at all. 
Also consider that this proposed solution focuses solely on the market 
for patent-protected drugs. Once generic equivalents enter the 
marketplace, there is reason to believe that prices will drop to a point 
where there may be insufficient manufacturer incentive for further 
research. Thus, in analyzing the competitive market for any specific 
condition, the reimbursement cap must focus solely on the patent-
protected competitors. For example, if there are five FDA-approved 
treatments for a condition and two of the treatments have lost patent 
protection and have generic equivalents available, the reimbursement cap 
would only consider the three other FDA-approved treatments. Even 
under this formulation, the existence of the generic products may still 
have some downward influence on the market price, but excluding such 
influence is likely to be difficult and of limited benefit. 
Regardless of the precise optimal reimbursement rate, all reform 
proposals hinge upon one critical piece of information: tying patient 
indication to the prescription. Without this key piece of information, this 
article’s proposed reforms are infeasible. Reimbursement based upon 
indication requires that we actually have the indication for which a drug 
was prescribed. 
Implementing such a change in reimbursement would require 
significant statutory, regulatory, and professional changes. These changes 
will be difficult, though, and unlikely in the short term. First, the FDA and 
CMS have demonstrated a long-standing commitment to avoiding 
interference with the practice of medicine.110 Forcing physicians to 
fundamentally change their drug prescription process seems contrary to 
its non-interference commitment. As CMS has noted, including a diagnosis 
in a prescription is not presently standard practice.111 Moreover, 
information included with prescriptions is generally governed by state law 
and outside of CMS’s present statutory authority.112 Finally, present  
110. See Beck & Azari, supra note 12, at 76. (stating that the FDCA was “not intended 
as a medical practices act and [did] not interfere with the practice of the healing 
art.”); see also Weber et al., supra note 7 (quoting Jonathan Blum, director of 
Medicare, that agency philosophy “really has been to defer to physicians.”). 
111. OIG PART D REIMBURSEMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 6. 
112. Id. at 6. 
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coding standards for diagnosis are not sufficiently detailed to correspond 
with CMS rules regarding medically accepted indications.113 
V. FCA liability as a claw-back for windfall off-label profits. 
Despite the above barriers to a first best solution, there are 
immediate steps that could be taken to reduce the excessive costs 
stemming from the flawed Part D reimbursement scheme for off-label 
uses of drugs. I begin this part with an overview of existing short-term 
proposals, followed with a proposal for expanding use of the civil False 
Claims Act. 
A. Interim solutions are not priorities 
The Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”) of HHS has recognized the 
core informational disconnect within Medicare Part D and has mentioned 
a variety of proposals to address the problem.114 These proposals, 
however, all share one common flaw: they require CMS to shift limited 
resources towards addressing this challenge. As suggested in the CMS 
response to the OIG report, such increased resource allocation is unlikely 
and the detection of improper off-label drug reimbursement faces 
numerous obstacles.115 A review of the alternative OIG proposed interim 
solutions follows. 
1. Prior authorization 
Prior authorization is a prepayment strategy that could provide the 
missing informational link between prescription and diagnosis. Prior 
authorization requires explicit authorization from Medicare prior to a 
patient obtaining drugs.116 Presently, CMS permits Medicare Part D 
sponsors to use prior authorization for certain drugs that are at high risk 
for prescription without a medically accepted indication.117 Prior 
authorization could be expanded, but it is viewed as a cumbersome, time-
consuming process that limits patient access to drugs.118 Because of its 
cumbersome nature, regulations presently prohibit sponsors from using 
prior authorization for six classes of drugs.119 A more limited proposal is to 
require prior authorization for drugs exceeding a specific reimbursement 
cost.120  
113. Id. at 8. 
114. Id. at 9.  
115. Id. at 8-9. 
116. Id. at 2. 
117. See id. at 8. 
118. Murriel R. Gillick, Controlling Off-Label Medication Use, ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 344, 
346-47 (2009). 
119. See 74 Fed. Reg. 2882 (Jan. 16, 2009). 
120. Gillick, supra note 118, at 346-47. 
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The present situation suggests that the Part D sponsors are not 
interested in expanding prior authorization, nor is CMS encouraging them 
to do so.121 This may be evidence that CMS and the sponsors are 
responsive to the patient and physician interest in ease of access to 
medications. 
2. Post-payment Audits 
Another option is requiring Part D sponsors to conduct audits of prior 
payments. Sponsors could obtain diagnosis information from physicians 
and retroactively compare those notes with drug reimbursements. Again, 
the main challenge here is that sponsors and CMS apparently do not seem 
motivated to conduct such audits.122 
A secondary, more technical problem is that CMS may approve 
payments that are part of certain drug compendia, but subscribers may 
only have access to the most recent version of those compendia.123 
Because at least one compendium is updated on a quarterly basis, 
sponsors would have to complete audits on a timely basis. 
Given the reluctance of CMS and its delegates to prioritize either an 
interim solution or the larger systematic challenge, filling in the 
information gap requires some third-party action. The civil FCA may fill 
this role, given its prominent involvement of whistleblowers. The FCA can 
serve as a temporary transition to a diagnosis-based reimbursement 
regime. 
B. General FCA Background 
The False Claims Act has become one of the most prominent tools in 
combatting fraud against the federal government.124 The FCA generally 
proscribes fraud or false claims against the federal government.125 The 
relevant mens rea for defendant liability is knowledge; the statute defines 
“knowledge” to include a person who “acts in reckless disregard of the 
truth or falsity of the information; and [the statute] require[s] no proof of 
specific intent to defraud.”126 The FCA has both civil and criminal 
provisions; this article focuses solely on the civil FCA. 
 
121. See OIG PART D REIMBURSEMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 2. 
122. See id. 
123. See id. at 1-2. 
124. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Over $3.5 
Billion From False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2015 (Dec. 3, 2015), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-35-billion-
false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2015. 
125. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-30 (2012). The civil FCA also has a criminal counterpart found 
in 18 U.S.C. § 287, but for reasons similar to the FDCA, I do not focus on criminal 
sanctions in this article. 
126. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1) (2012). 
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Besides traditional public enforcement, the FCA also contains qui tam 
provisions, which allow private litigants—known as “relators”—to pursue 
civil actions and prosecute cases of fraud in lieu of the Department of 
Justice (“DOJ”).127 Today, relators can receive as much as thirty percent of 
the civil recovery, which can be substantial given the statute’s treble 
damages provisions. Civil penalties also include $5500 to $11,000 in fines 
per false claim. A successful relator is also entitled to legal fees from the 
defendant.128 
As a practical matter, though, the FCA is an information-providing 
system rather than a private-enforcement system.129 The vast majority of 
FCA cases in which the relator recovers from the defendants are DOJ-
prosecuted cases.130 The law firms that represent relators in FCA actions 
generally specialize in obtaining DOJ intervention.131 Purely private 
enforcement of the FCA is generally either not pursued or unsuccessful.132 
Thus, the FCA broadly functions as a whistleblower system in which 
relators provide information to the DOJ and the DOJ decides whether or 
not to pursue the defendant based on such information.133 
C. The existing theory of off-label promotion as an FCA violation 
Roughly sixty percent of FCA cases today involve allegations of 
healthcare fraud.134 Some of the largest settlements generally involve off-
label promotion claims.135 The FCA’s present role is contentious for a 
variety of reasons and this article’s proposed solution of leveraging FCA 
liability as a claw-back mechanism is likely to be similarly contentious. 
 
127. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012). 
128. Id. 
129. See David Kwok, Evidence from the False Claims Act: Does Private Enforcement 
Attract Excessive Litigation?, 42 PUB. CONT. L. J. 225, 227-28 (2013). 
130. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMERCIAL LITIGATION BRANCH, FRAUD SECTION, FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
STATISTICS (2015), http://www.justice.gov/file/fcastatspdf/download [hereinafter 
FALSE CLAIMS ACT STATISTICS]. 
131. See Kwok, supra note 129, at 237-38. 
132. FALSE CLAIMS ACT STATISTICS, supra note 130. 
133. See Kwok, supra note 129, at 226-30; FALSE CLAIMS ACT STATISTICS, supra note 130. 
134. See FALSE CLAIMS ACT STATISTICS, supra note 130. 
135. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Johnson & Johnson to Pay More 
Than $2.2 Billion to Resolve Criminal and Civil Investigations (Nov. 4, 2013), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/johnson-johnson-pay-more-22-
billion-resolve-criminal-and-civil-investigations; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Justice Department Recovers $3.8 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in 
Fiscal Year 2013 (Dec. 20, 2013), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-38-billion-false-
claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2013 (referencing $1.5 billion Abbott case and $762 
million Amgen case). 
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While FCA cases typically address direct fraud against the federal 
government,136 such as a healthcare provider billing Medicare for a 
procedure that was never performed, the courts have recognized FCA 
cases under an inducement-of-fraud theory for off-label promotion.137 
Under this theory, “[a]ny person who . . . knowingly . . . causes to be 
presented a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval . . . is 
liable.”138 As applied to the case of off-label uses of pharmaceuticals, the 
false claim is the healthcare provider’s paperwork billing Medicare for a 
drug used in a non-reimbursable manner. While Medicare would be 
willing to reimburse for an on-label, medically acceptable use, it would not 
reimburse for an off-label, non-medically-acceptable use. Billing Medicare 
for the on-label use while using it for the non-medically-acceptable use 
would be considered a false claim, as Medicare would not have 
reimbursed had it known the truth about the drug’s usage with that 
particular patient. 
The manufacturer is liable under this inducement theory because it is 
the arguable cause of the healthcare provider’s billing. The provider 
presents the false claim, but the off-label promotional efforts of the 
manufacturer cause the provider to do so. If the manufacturer had not 
told the provider about the alternative uses for the drug, then the 
provider would not have prescribed the drug for those alternative, non-
medically-accepted indications. 
The FCA has proven to be desirable in off-label-promotion cases due 
to the information problem described earlier; detection of off-label usage 
is difficult under the present system and there is little day-to-day 
government oversight of manufacturers’ representatives in the field. The 
FCA’s whistleblower provisions provide an incentive for those who have 
information about manufacturer’s behavior to come forward. 
D. Off-label promotion cases under the FCA have been contentious for a 
number of reasons. 
1. Off-label promotion does not fit the statutory purpose 
First, there is the broader problem of the FCA’s original statutory 
purpose. The FCA originally targeted wartime-fraud cases in which the 
government paid for military supplies and received, for example, sawdust 
instead of gunpowder.139 It is clear that the government suffered loss in  
136. See CLAIRE M. SYLVIA, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT § 4:2 
(2016). 
137. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 49 (D. 
Mass. 2001). 
138. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2012). 
139. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 127 F.2d 233, 236 (quoting FRED. A. 
SHANNON, ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNION ARMY, 56-58 
(1928)) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted), rev’d, 317 
U.S. 537 (1943); J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication 
of Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 539, 554-55 (2000). 
Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017 
Controlling Excessive Off-Label Medicare Drug Costs Through the False Claims Act 
216 
such a transaction, and courts are most comfortable in assigning liability 
when the government receives nothing of value in exchange for 
payment.140 
Many modern FCA cases, however, have addressed more difficult 
problems given the more complex regulatory and administrative state. 
Courts have been divided as to when civil FCA liability should attach, as it 
is unclear if any known regulatory violation makes a claim false or 
fraudulent.141 In Ab-Tech v. United States, for example, the court agreed 
with the defendant that the government had obtained the benefit of the 
contracted services, despite a regulatory violation.142 The defendant 
contractor constructed an automated data-processing facility in 
accordance with the government’s physical specifications, but it did not 
comply with the terms of the Small Business Act.143 The court upheld civil 
FCA liability, but rejected damages in that context. 144 The government 
paid $1.4 million to Ab-Tech and requested $4.2 million plus interest as 
treble damages, but the court found there were no damages to treble.145 
The court noted that when “viewed strictly as a capital investment, the 
Government got essentially what it paid for.”146 
Generally, courts have attempted to establish some limitations on 
behavior that could constitute a fraudulent or false claim under the 
FCA.147 The Second Circuit, for example, expressed discomfort in 
extending FCA liability in the healthcare context, noting that “the False 
 
140. See Ab-Tech Constr., Inc. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429, 434 (1994), aff’d, 57 
F.3d 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
141. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Cantekin v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 192 F.3d 402, 415 
(3d Cir.1999) (“[N]ot every regulatory violation is tantamount to making a 
knowingly false statement to the government.”), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 880 
(2000); United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA, 125 F.3d 899, 902 (5th 
Cir. 1997) (“claims for services rendered in violation of a statute do not 
necessarily constitute false or fraudulent claims under the FCA.”); United States 
ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1266–67 (9th Cir.1996) (“Violations of 
laws, rules, or regulations alone do not create a cause of action under the FCA.”), 
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1115 (1997); United States v. White, 765 F.2d 1469, 1479–
80 (11th Cir.1985) (FCA case based on altered time cards submitted in violation 
of the Truth in Negotiations Act); Pickens v. Kanawha River Towing, 916 F. Supp. 
702, 705–06 (S. D. Ohio 1996) (remedies under federal Clean Water Act did not 
preempt FCA action); United States ex rel. Fallon v. Accudyne Corp., 880 F. Supp. 
636, 638 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (allowing FCA action based on failure to comply with 
environmental standards); United States v. Incorporated Village of Island Park, 
888 F. Supp. 419, 440 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (allowing FCA action based on failure to 
comply with non-discrimination requirements). 
142. Ab-Tech Constr., Inc., 31 Fed. Cl. at 434. 
143. Id. 
144. Id.  
145. Id.  
146. Id. 
147. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1989 (2016). 
Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017 
Controlling Excessive Off-Label Medicare Drug Costs Through the False Claims Act 
217 
Claims Act was not designed for use as a blunt instrument to enforce 
compliance with all medical regulations.”148 Some courts have focused on 
whether defendants implicitly or explicitly certified compliance with 
regulations or contracts in determining whether or not there was a civil 
FCA violation.149 
These limitations reflect a number of different concerns. One problem 
is that courts may be uncertain about whether harm results from the 
conduct; if the government feels it is acceptable for a physician to 
prescribe off-label, this behavior must not be very harmful or may actually 
be desirable.150 Under such conditions, it may be difficult or inappropriate 
to sanction a manufacturer. 
Another problem is that courts feel that the FCA is punitive in 
nature.151 Unless the defendant has committed some wrong that is closer 
to malum in se, courts might feel that a technical regulatory violation does 
not deserve punishment and would be likely to label the violation as not 
material.152 
On the other hand, if there is concern that sanctions are too great or 
improperly calculated, it is important to note that the prevalence of off-
label promotion cases suggests that manufacturers are not deterred by 
FCA sanctions.153 In 2013, Pfizer had the distinction of settling its fifth case 
of off-label promotion since 2002.154 In one of its earlier cases, from 2009, 
Pfizer paid $2.3 billion to settle healthcare fraud charges arising from 
improper marketing activities relating to four drugs; it was the largest 
healthcare-fraud settlement in history at the time.155 Arguably, these 
 
148. United States ex. rel. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 699 (2d Cir. 2001). But see 
Universal Health Servs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1988-99 (abrogating Mikes v. Straus). 
149. See Universal Health Servs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1999; David Kwok, A Fair 
Competition Theory of the Civil False Claims Act, 94 NEB. L. REV. 355, 365 (2015). 
150. See Coleen Klasmeier & Martin H. Redish, Off-Label Prescription Advertising, the 
FDA and the First Amendment: A Study in the Values of Commercial Speech 
Protection, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 315, 318 (2011). 
151. See Universal Health Servs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1996 (describing civil penalties as 
“essentially punitive in nature.”). But see Cook Cnty., Ill. v. U.S. ex rel. Chandler, 
538 U.S. 119, 130 (2003) (claiming “the tipping point between payback and 
punishment defies general formulation.”). 
152. See Universal Health Servs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 2001. 
153. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Nearly $ 5 
Billion in False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2012 (Dec. 4, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/December/12-ag-1439.html. 
154. See Hui Zhang & Gregory S. Zaric, Using Price–Volume Agreements to Manage 
Pharmaceutical Leakage and Off-Label Promotion, 16 EUR. J. HEALTH ECON. 747 
(2015). 
155. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces Largest 
Health Care Fraud Settlement in Its History (Sept. 2, 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/September/09-civ-900.html. 
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repeated settlements suggest that Pfizer may not be deterred by the 
present enforcement scheme. 
2. Causality 
A more specific challenge for FCA liability in the off-label-promotion 
context is causality. There is a long causal chain between the 
manufacturer’s promotional efforts and the improper reimbursement 
from Medicare.156 
The most proximate cause of harm to Medicare is the healthcare 
provider submitting reimbursement for a drug that has been prescribed 
for a non-CMS-approved indication.157 If CMS had known the truth about 
the indication, it would not have provided reimbursement for that drug 
prescription. 
In comparison, the manufacturer’s promotional efforts’ role in causing 
the improper reimbursement is more attenuated and uncertain. Given the 
general availability of studies and drug compendia regarding off-label drug 
uses, it is entirely possible for providers to learn of off-label uses 
independent of the manufacturer’s paid representatives.158 To the extent 
that CMS approval does not correspond with the drug compendia 
recommendations, there is plenty of opportunity for providers to 
improperly bill Medicare without direct intervention by the manufacturer. 
Of course, off-label clinical studies may be funded by the manufacturer, 
but that is also a more attenuated causal inference, and those studies may 
also offer societal benefit. 
Moreover, some commentators have argued that manufacturers 
should not be held liable because of a specificity problem.159 They suggest 
that a manufacturer should only be held liable if they have “specific 
knowledge of the falsity of the claim in question.”160 Thus, while 
manufacturers might have general knowledge that a number of claims are 
false, they do not know which specific claims are actually false. 
Important for this article’s purposes, though, is that there is no falsity 
requirement for the manufacturer’s promotional efforts, because off-label 
promotion claims are under section 3729(a)(1)(A). Claims under section 
3729(a)(1)(B) have a “double falsehood” requirement; the statute holds 
liable any person who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or 
 
156. Ralph F. Hall & Robert J. Berlin, When You Have a Hammer Everything Looks Like 
a Nail: Misapplication of the False Claims Act to Off-Label Promotion, 61 FOOD & 
DRUG L. J. 653, 673 (2006). 
157. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 51 (5th 
Cir. 1975). 
158. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 73, at 550 (noting that the FDCA does not 
regulate non-manufacturers speech regarding off-label uses and that such 
independent speech may be more reliable). 
159. See Hall & Berlin, supra note 156, at 673. 
160. Id. 
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used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent 
claim.”161 In contrast, there is no “double falsehood” requirement under 
section 3729(a)(1)(A).162 There is no need to allege that a false statement 
led to the false claim.163 Moreover, these false claims may be filed by 
innocent third parties.164 
As some critics have noted, the role of the healthcare provider in 
prescribing a drug is certainly another cause of the eventual submission 
for off-label reimbursement.165 The expertise of the healthcare provider 
may serve to cut causality here.166 Moreover, critics relatedly argue that if 
manufacturers face liability for their attenuated causal role in driving the 
submission for reimbursement, many other parties might also face 
liability.167 Nonetheless, the FCA’s broad definition of “knowing” seems to 
suggest that the attenuated-causality theory under off-label promotion is 
sufficient to establish liability.168 
E. Expanding FCA liability as a claw-back for excessive reimbursement
If we can tolerate the present concerns about FCA liability for off-label 
promotion, we can next consider whether expanding liability makes sense. 
Given that the present reimbursement system does not properly track 
indications, manufacturers will obtain improper profits through excessive 
off-label prescriptions and reimbursement. Thus, the remaining interim 
solution is to claw back those improper profits. Expanding civil FCA liability 
is the best immediate choice for detecting those problems and bringing 
back those profits. 
1. The Proposal
This proposal suggests that courts hold manufacturers generally liable 
under the civil FCA for excess profits from improper Medicare Part D off-
161. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012); See also United States ex rel. Franklin, 2003 WL
22048255 at *2-*3.
162. See Appellant’s Reply Brief, United States, et al. ex rel. Michael Keeler, Plaintiff-
Appellant, v. EISAI, Inc. Defendant-Appellee., Nos. 13-10973-F, 13-11949-F, 2014
WL 99645 at *9. (11th Cir. Jan 2, 2014). 
163. See United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, No. Civ.A. 96–11651PBS, 2003
WL 22048255 (D. Mass. 2003). 
164. See Appellant’s Reply Brief, United States, et al. ex rel. Michael Keeler v. EISAI,
Inc., Nos. 13-10973-F, 13-11949-F, 2014 WL 99645 at *9. (11th Cir. Jan 2, 2014). 
165. See Hall & Berlin, supra note 156, at 673.
166. See id. at 665. 
167. See id. at 673 (“If so, then any person including an independent physician, who
discusses off-label uses would be liable under the FCA.”).
168. See id. at 674 (proposing FCA liability scheme in which manufacturers “would 
have to have a specific intent to cause a specific treatment reimbursement
submission . . . ”) The present FCA explicitly rejects a specific intent requirement.
See 31 U.S.C. 3729 (b)(1)(B) (2012).
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label reimbursement. Rather than looking at manufacturer’s promotional 
behavior, courts should view manufacturers as liable under the FCA 
because they are a cause of the improper reimbursement and they profit 
from such improper reimbursements. The goal is to pursue the theoretical 
solution in part IV by clawing back the excessive off-label drug profits from 
manufacturers. 
This is a mild expansion of the existing off-label promotion doctrine. 
HHS can continue to rely upon whistleblowers to identify egregious off-
label promotional behavior. Under this proposal, HHS would also rely 
upon whistleblowers to identify off-label prescription and the frequency 
of reimbursement for off-label prescription, independent of egregious 
manufacturer behavior. 
Inferring that manufacturers are knowing, general cause of improper 
reimbursements is not a large step from the presently accepted inference 
that egregious manufacturer behavior causes improper 
reimbursements.169 This one step is sufficient to address cases of 
completely improper off-label prescriptions—prescriptions that should not 
be reimbursable at all under Medicare Part D. One example of a 
completely improper off-label prescription would be a prescription for a 
drug that does not match indications in any of the specified compendia.170 
Another example would be if CMS has already considered the unapproved 
indication and explicitly rejected it for good reason. One good reason for 
rejecting the use of a drug for a particular indication would be the 
existence of sufficient scientific studies to evaluate effectiveness and 
safety for the unapproved condition that found the drug to be ineffective 
or unsafe for the unapproved condition.171 Manufacturers would be liable 
for the entire reimbursement amount for such non-reimbursable off-label 
prescriptions. 
Perhaps the more challenging step is addressing the proper 
reimbursement rate for off-label prescriptions. The present system is 
binary; either a drug is reimbursable or it is not. As described in Part IV, I 
propose a more calibrated approach: implementing a cap on 
reimbursement rates. Courts or CMS would declare that any 
 
169. See Hall & Berlin, supra note 156, at 673. 
170. See SOCIAL SECURITY ACT OF 1935, Pub. L. 74-271, § 1927(g)(1)(B)(i); Also, following 
existing case law, illegal kickbacks to physicians would also make such 
prescriptions sanctionable under the FCA. See, e.g., United States ex rel. 
Hutcheson v. Blackstone Medical, Inc., 647 F.3d 377, 379 (1st Cir. 2011). 
171. This is the rough existing rule regarding Medicare Part A, which indicates that 
“[a]s long as the FDA has not specified such use as non-approved, coverage is 
determined taking into consideration the generally accepted medical practice in 
the community.” CENTERS FOR MEDICAID AND MEDICARE SERVICES, MEDICARE BENEFIT 
POLICY MANUAL § 1.30 (2014), available at https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-
Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/Downloads/bp102c01.pdf; 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395x(t)(2)(B)(II) (2016). 
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reimbursement rate in excess of the capped competitive rate is subject to 
FCA liability. 
This cap would only be triggered if the off-label condition has patent-
protected, FDA-approved treatments available. If one such treatment 
exists and its cost is less than the price of the off-label drug, then the civil 
sanction should be the difference in rates.172 If there are multiple 
approved reimbursement rates, the relevant rate should be the lowest 
reimbursement rate or any of the other options presented earlier in Part 
IV.A. 
If there are no approved treatments for the unapproved indication, 
then there are a number of possibilities. An aggressive move would be to 
cap all unapproved treatments at the same reimbursement level. This 
would level the playing field and reduce costs for Medicare. Here, 
however, it is unclear whether there is a strong need for intervention, 
given that no manufacturer has satisfied government standards for 
approval. The more cautious alternative is to disallow civil liability in this 
scenario. If there are no other treatments, approved or unapproved, for 
the unapproved indication, then there is no civil liability. 
This strategy will incorporate proper incentives for manufacturers to 
bring the best products to market. If providers truly believe that a drug is 
effective for a condition that CMS has not approved condition and CMS 
has not explicitly rejected the drug, allowing limited reimbursement will 
provide an incentive for CMS to make a clear determination about the 
cost-effectiveness of the drug. Basing effective reimbursement on the 
lowest reimbursement rate will also help ensure that the manufacturer 
does not have a competitive advantage over competitors who have 
already obtained CMS approval for the same indication. 
Additionally, establishing third-party restitution liability for 
manufacturers ensures that unapproved CMS reimbursements are not 
simply a windfall for manufacturers who produce an expensive drug. The 
fact that a manufacturer has not participated in improper off-label 
promotion efforts should not be an open door for it to benefit from 
improper physician-billing practices. Nonetheless, this article’s approach 
attempts to balance those revenues with the potential good that 
providers may be accomplishing. 
Note also that this proposal provides for sanctions for off-label 
reimbursements even if those drugs eventually receive FDA approval for 
the off-label condition. Of course, once those drugs receive FDA approval 
for the off-label condition, there will be no further FCA liability. Not all off-
label treatments will eventually receive FDA approval, and there may be a 
variety of reasons for such lack of approval. For drugs that do eventually 
receive approval for the off-label condition, though, note that those 
 
172. See, e.g., In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. 04–cv–10739–PBS, 
2011 WL 3852254 at 98-99 (D. Mass. Aug. 31, 2011), aff’d Kaiser Foundation 
Health Plan, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc. (In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig.), 712 
F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 786 (2013). 
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manufacturers are still civilly liable for excess profits obtained prior to FDA 
approval. While such manufacturers may enjoy high prices unconstrained 
by the FCA after they obtain FDA approval, that benefit does not extend to 
sales made prior to FDA approval for the off-label condition. 
2. The statutory basis for the proposal 
There are at least two potential bases for manufacturer liability under 
this proposal. I discuss the most commonly used basis first, section 
3729(a)(1)(A). Present actions for off-label promotion typically proceed 
under this portion of the statute.173 
a) Section 3729(a)(1)(A): “Presentation of a false or fraudulent claim” 
As discussed earlier, under section 3729(a)(1)(A), the manufacturer is 
liable because it is knowingly inducing healthcare providers to bill 
Medicare for prescription drugs that are not actually reimbursable due to 
their non-covered off-label usage. Important to note here is that 
purposeful behavior is not required; the fact that the manufacturer knows 
or acts in reckless disregard of the improper billing is sufficient.174 Given 
manufacturer involvement in researching and testing for off-label 
usage,175 it is difficult to believe that any manufacturer could claim 
ignorance of such billing. 
The challenge, of course, is in the causal inference under this portion 
of the statute. Did the manufacturer cause the healthcare provider to 
improperly bill Medicare? I suggest that courts take a broad view of 
causation here rather than focusing on the manufacturer’s marketing 
behavior. If the manufacturer conducted or contributed to the research 
relating the drug to the off-label indication, this alone should be sufficient 
to demonstrate causation of improper billing. 
Thus, courts should set aside their reluctance to impose liability, 
although their motivation to impose liability likely lies more in the damage 
done by improper billing and the instrumental usefulness of the FCA. 
b) Section 3729(a)(1)(G): “Reverse False Claims” 
The expanded version of the reverse-false-claims provision, section 
3729(a)(1)(G), was introduced in 2009 as part of the Fraud Enforcement 
and Recovery Act of 2009 and has yet to generate substantial case law.176 
Nonetheless, it provides an alternative route for liability. Section 
3729(a)(1)(G) establishes liability for a person who knowingly conceals or 
knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or 
transmit money or property to the Government. The Affordable Care Act 
 
173. See SYLVIA, supra note 136. 
174. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1) (2012). 
175. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(5)(C) (2015). 
176. See THE ELEMENTS OF A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT BEFORE AND AFTER 
FERA, 1 CIV. FALSE CLAIMS & QUI TAM ACTIONS (CCH)§ 2.01, 2015 WL 4602833 (2016). 
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(“ACA”) specifies that Medicare overpayments are obligations subject to 
liability under the FCA.177 Under the ACA, Medicare overpayments must 
be reported and returned within sixty days of identification; they are 
otherwise grounds for FCA liability.178 
Unlike section 3729(a)(1)(A), which looks at the cause of the excessive 
Part D reimbursements, section 3729(a)(1)(G) addresses parties who know 
of an obligation to pay the government. Given their role in researching off-
label drug usage, manufacturers know that they improperly benefit from 
such off-label reimbursements.179 They therefore have an obligation to 
pay those excessive profits back. 
The difficult part is establishing the element of “identification” of 
overpayments under this theory. First, as a matter of law, it must be 
established that reimbursement above the competitive cap for an off-label 
drug prescription is improper.180 Second, someone must identify such 
overpayments. This dovetails with the existing specificity problem under 
section 3729(a)(1)(A) as discussed earlier in section V.C.2. Does 
“identification” correspond with specific knowledge of a particular claim’s 
falsity? Such knowledge seems difficult to come by. 
As a practical matter, this prong is most likely useful if statistical 
sampling of aggregate prescription rates with aggregate diagnosis rates is 
sufficient to establish liability. Given manufacturer’s research into 
indications for their products, they should know—or at least be aware 
of—the risk of off-label usage and how much they might benefit. To the 
extent that they benefit improperly from off-label usage billed to CMS, the 
reverse-false-claims provision can establish civil FCA liability. 
3. Why this proposal works 
a) Relators provide the link between indication and prescription. 
The FCA allows private litigants to pursue actions against 
manufacturers in the form of qui tam lawsuits. Without extensive 
overhaul of the present prescription and reimbursement system, it is very 
costly for CMS and its delegates to determine the eligibility of drugs for 
reimbursement under Part D, and investing in such improved data 
acquisition does not appear to be a present priority for CMS.181 
Investigating individual doctors and providers is costly. Manufacturers and 
insiders are best positioned to observe off-label drug issues and to bring 
them to light. 
 
177. See AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1128J (d) [hereinafter ACA]. 
178. ACA §1128J(d)(1)-(2). 
179. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(5)(C). 
180. See, e.g., United States of America ex rel. Elaine Bennett v. Boston Sci. Corp. and 
Guidant Corp., No. Civ. A. H-07-2467, 2011 WL 1231577, at *5 n.5 (S.D. Tex. 
2011). 
181. See OIG PART D REIMBURSEMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 4; See also Weber et al. 
supra note 7. 
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Relators can provide a variety of information to make this system 
work. The present doctrine of off-label promotion has relators focused 
upon manufacturers’ promotional behavior. The increased scope of 
manufacturer liability under this proposal allows relators with different 
types of information to come forward. One possibility is relators who have 
direct information linking prescriptions together with indications; this 
would be the most direct linkage between reimbursements and the use of 
the drug. Another possibility would simply be evidence that 
manufacturers know of the aggregate rates of off-label prescriptions and 
reimbursements. 
Additionally, this form of litigation provides payment for the cost of 
detection. The FCA provides for attorneys’ fees,182 which helps 
compensate for the role of attorneys in detecting offenses. The 
percentage bounty for relators similarly compensates for their efforts in 
uncovering off-label drug usage and reimbursement. 
An alternative to FCA liability would be litigation under a theory of 
unjust enrichment.183 Civil liability for unjust enrichment incorporates the 
possibility that the defendant did no wrong but was simply the unknowing 
recipient of unjust gains. As noted above, though, this form of litigation 
requires information regarding diagnosis, so this cause of action would be 
extremely difficult without whistleblower support. 
b) Manufacturers are the ones who profit. 
Liability under the FCA is fair, given the allocation of revenue from the 
off-label reimbursement. Unless there are kickbacks or other improper 
incentives at play, the provider is not a direct beneficiary of the improper 
billing, except to the extent that the provider generates goodwill and 
business from the patient. The primary beneficiaries are the patient who 
receives the drug and the manufacturer. The patient’s benefit is from 
improved health, which can be difficult to quantify. Moreover, it is 
politically difficult to go after individual patients who may attract 
sympathy and may not be aware of the off-label nature of their treatment. 
As a practical matter, the manufacturer accrues benefit and thus is in a 
position to pay civilly. 
VI. Concerns 
A. Stigma and signaling 
Expanding FCA liability for manufacturers and off-label drug 
reimbursement may raise the problem of excessive stigmatic harm by 
lumping defendants with varying levels of moral culpability together. A 
healthcare provider committing fraud by collecting Medicare payments for 
 
182. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2012). 
183. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 41 (AM. LAW INST. 
2011). 
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which no service was provided could be liable under the FCA, as could a 
manufacturer engaging in truthful off-label promotion of a useful 
pharmaceutical product. 
I suggest that on the balance, though, there is actually insufficient 
stigmatic sanction under the FCA. As stated in that statute, the FCA 
addresses false or fraudulent claims. Falsity is a less morally laden 
description than fraud.184 Only certain portions of the FCA actually require 
fraudulent intent.185 Thus, for a defendant committing outright fraud 
through non-delivery of service, there is probably insufficient stigmatic 
harm in FCA liability. 
Nonetheless, to the extent that there may be excessive stigmatic 
harm through the aggregation of fraud and falsity in the statute, the DOJ 
could seek to alleviate this harm by emphasizing the falsity aspect in press 
releases. 
As noted above, another solution would be to pursue civil remedies 
under the doctrine of unjust enrichment. Civil liability for unjust 
enrichment incorporates the possibility that the defendant did no wrong 
but was simply the unknowing recipient of unjust gains.186 The 
combination of litigation and the “unjust” portion of the label may have 
sufficient stigmatic power against the defendant for those reading the 
popular press. 
As a practical concern, the stigmatic and signaling effects of FCA 
liability may impact manufacturer behavior. They may further discourage 
manufacturer investment in off-label drug usage. Note that this proposal 
deliberately attempts to reduce manufacturer over-investment in off-label 
drug usage. It is possible that combining the reduced reimbursement rates 
with the stigma of FCA liability may overly reduce manufacturer 
investment. As noted in Part IV, the harms from off-label usage may be 
higher than assumed in Part III’s model, so such increased reduction may 
actually be desirable. 
Stigma could also affect healthcare providers. While this article does 
not propose litigation against healthcare providers, it is entirely possible 
that providers would learn about litigation against particular 
manufacturers and their drugs. A number of problems might result from 
such knowledge. One might be that healthcare providers might simply be 
more reluctant to prescribe a manufacturer’s drugs because they 
interpreted the litigation news as generalized wrongdoing. Professional 
norms would hopefully prevent healthcare providers from drawing strong 
negative inferences in such cases. Rather, if they really believed that a 
drug was particularly risky as a result of hearing of manufacturer litigation, 
 
184. Fraud incorporates the intent to deceive for the purposes of causing some loss. 
See, e.g., United States v. Hawkey, 148 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 1998). 
185. See, e.g., 31 U.S. C. 3729(a)(1)(E) (2012). 
186. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 41 (AM. LAW INST. 
2011). 
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they would directly investigate the scientific studies concerning the drug. 
Nonetheless, the stigmatic effects might still subtly reduce healthcare 
providers’ prescriptions of certain drugs, even for on-label conditions and 
might reduce provider reliance upon manufacturer-sponsored 
information. Such reduced reliance might be in society’s interest, 
depending on society’s beliefs concerning the value of manufacturer-
sponsored information. 
Healthcare providers might also feel the threat of litigation, even if 
whistleblowers and assistant U.S. attorneys do not target them directly. 
The theory of liability under this proposal emphasizes cause-in-fact; the 
providers likely have at least comparable levels of causal responsibility for 
off-label drug reimbursements. While providers do not profit in the same 
way that manufacturers do, they may be concerned about being subject 
to at least the threat of civil liability. The risk of such fears may be 
assuaged by continued statements from the FDA and HHS that they do not 
intend to regulate the practice of medicine. 
B. Manufacturers still excessively profit from off-label reimbursement. 
This claw-back proposal under the FCA is not a panacea; 
manufacturers will still profit from off-label reimbursements in a variety of 
ways. 
1. Manufacturers with no knowledge 
First, a manufacturer could avoid FCA liability if it had no knowledge 
of the off-label reimbursements. The FCA diverges from an ideal solution 
for these profits in that it contains a mens rea component. In theory, the 
optimal solution would be strict liability for windfall profits; the 
unintended over-reimbursement by the government for off-label 
prescriptions is a real loss, regardless of the manufacturer’s subjective 
awareness of those windfall profits. Nonetheless, given the incentive for 
manufacturers to study and track the effectiveness and reach of their 
products, it seems unlikely that manufacturers would be unaware of the 
general practice of off-label reimbursement. 
It is technically possible that a manufacturer might not only have no 
knowledge of the off-label usage, but it might also have not contributed at 
all to the research leading to the discovery of the off-label indication. The 
ideal claw-back solution would need a relatively broad causal theory to 
claim that manufacturers were liable for the improper off-label drug 
reimbursements. 
Pushing the law to this point may be desirable from a claw-back 
perspective, but such precedent might cause difficulties in other areas of 
the FCA. The preferable long-term solution is actual statutory reform of 
the reimbursement system, rather than acceptance of the more 
attenuated causality. 
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2. Profits from private insurance 
The improper windfall profits are the result of not only government 
payments; they may also be the result of private-insurer payments. 
Implementing this FCA-based claw-back system in the interim will not 
completely solve the inequitable distribution of profits stemming from off-
label reimbursement. To the extent that private health insurance 
companies also face disparities regarding off-label reimbursement, there 
may still be excessive expenditures and improper incentives. Rather than 
the government bearing the costs of such excessive expenditures, though, 
private health insurance companies likely pass along such excessive costs 
to their insured. 
While excessive costs for private health-insurance companies are not 
the focus of this paper, it is important to acknowledge that those 
companies may face challenges that parallel the government’s challenges 
with off-label drug prescriptions. Some of the systematic changes 
proposed herein linking prescriptions to indications may similarly help 
private insurance companies address this shared problem with excessive 
healthcare costs. Private insurance companies may be useful allies in 
obtaining reforms of the prescription and reimbursement process; a fair 
discussion of the potential interaction between the private market for off-
label drugs and the government-led marketplace would require a separate 
paper. 
VII. Conclusion 
High drug prices are important in motivating pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to bring safe and effective products to market. At the same 
time, Medicare should not incur excessive drug costs by paying top dollar 
for drugs that have not been proven effective for treatment. 
Unfortunately, Medicare Part D is prone to excessive drug prices due to 
the practice of off-label drug prescription. The present systemic failure to 
link indication with reimbursement in the Medicare Part D regime 
encourages excessive prescription-drug costs from even well-intentioned 
manufacturers. Moreover, these flawed incentives also increase the risk of 
spillover effects for non-Medicare patients. Because manufacturers will 
over-invest in off-label drug usage, even non-Medicare patients may face 
increased exposure to expensive and ineffective off-label drug usage. This 
article proposes a theoretically superior Part D reimbursement system 
that allows for the development of an optimal level of off-label drug 
usage. In the long-term, such a reimbursement system will allow Medicare 
beneficiaries to obtain a variety of drugs for treatment while ensuring that 
Medicare is not paying higher prices for unproven drugs. 
The long-term solution requires substantial systemic and regulatory 
reforms that are not immediately likely. In the short term, civil 
enforcement through the civil False Claims Act can serve as an interim tool 
to limit excessive Part D off-label drug costs. Rather than emphasizing 
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punishment of wrongful behavior, the DOJ can leverage whistleblowers 
under the FCA to focus on facilitating fair reimbursement for off-label drug 
prescriptions. Even well-intentioned manufacturers can obtain windfall 
profits from off-label drug reimbursement. Off-label drug usage may be 
safe, effective, and desirable for some patients, but those benefits do not 
automatically justify windfall profits. Litigation under the FCA can claw 
back the excessive profits and correct the unfairness and improper 
incentives resulting from the present Medicare Part D reimbursement 
system. 
